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I. Introduction
The "often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"' forms the
backdrop for much of our thought about policework and underlies much
Fourth Amendment2 doctrine, but actually represents only about one-fifth to
one-third of patrol officers' activity.3 Police activity directed to a different
end-for example, correcting a dangerous condition on a highway or
assisting a person in need-fits uncomfortably within a conception of the
Constitution that permits intrusions into private areas only when the police
have obtained warrants based on probable cause 4 and specifying "the persons
1. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
2. Technically the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when the officer in question is
acting on behalf of a state rather than the national government. See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (finding that in order for a constitutional
amendment to apply to the states, the amendment must indicate an intention to apply to the
states). The protections of the Fourth Amendment have, however, been incorporated against the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolf. v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961) ("[T]he
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police is therefore implicit in 'the
concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause ... ." (internal quotations omitted)). For the sake of simplicity, this Article refers to the
Fourth Amendment whether the relevant government entity is state or national.
3. See PETER K. MANNING, POLICE WORK: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLICING 302
(1977) ("Estimates vary, but perhaps as much as 80% of an officer's duty is taken up with
assisting citizens, maintaining order, ensuring the smooth flow of traffic and pedestrians, and
routine patrol."), quoted in HOwARD ABADINSKY, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 34 (1984); SAMUEL
WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 5-6 (5th ed. 2005)
("Only about one-third of a patrol officer's activities are devoted to criminal law enforcement."
(citations omitted)); SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 46 (1993) [hereinafter WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM]
("[C]riminal law enforcement represents only a part of police work-between 20 and 30 percent
of a patrol officer's activities."); Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the
Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261,263 (1998) ("Police spend relatively less time
than is commonly thought investigating violations of the criminal law."); see also WALKER &
KATZ, supra, at 210 ("[O]nly 20 to 30 percent of all calls [to 911 ] for service involve criminal
law enforcement." (citing Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine
Activities and the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1989))).
4. Probable cause typically requires a level of individualized suspicion such that a person
"of reasonable caution" would believe that seizable objects are located at the place to be
searched, or that the person to be seized is involved in criminal activity. Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). The Court has redefined probable cause in the context of
searches to discover violations of administrative codes, permitting warrants to be issued upon a
showing only that the search would occur pursuant to regularized procedures. See Camara v.
Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) ("If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant."). This
Article discusses the applicability of the administrative warrants to the community-caretaking
context in Part IV.A, infra.
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or things to be seized."'
Recognizing the difficulty of applying the warrant "requirement," or
even a warrant "preference," to searches and seizures undertaken for a
purpose other than law enforcement, the Supreme Court has indicated in
several cases that the ordinary presumption that warrantless searches are
6 7unreasonable ceases to apply in the "community-caretaking" context.
Nevertheless, because searches necessarily involve government intrusion into
individuals' private spaces, the absence of constitutional restrictions for even
community-caretaking searches carries a substantial risk of abuse. As Justice
Brandeis famously warned, "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent ....
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.",8 But if community-caretaking
searches must comply with the general Fourth Amendment command of
"reasonableness," it is necessary to make that determination without reference
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The entire Amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
6. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("Searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.. .. "); Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-15 (noting that
searches without a warrant may be performed legally only in exceptional circumstances).
7. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 381 (1987) ("Inventory searches are not
subject to the warrant requirement because they are conducted by the government as part of a
'community caretaking' function .... "); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,374 (1976)
(finding a warrantless search valid in the context of community caretaking). See generally
Livingston, supra note 3, at 266-90.
8. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967). President Reagan similarly quipped that the most terrifyring words in the English
language are "I'm from the government and I'm here to help." He likely adopted the phrase
from columnist George F. Will. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 825 (Fred R. Shapiro ed.,
2006).
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to the usual standards for reasonableness: Probable cause9 and reasonable
suspicion' ° that the object of the search is connected to criminal activity.
Suppose, for example, that a patrol officer comes upon a vehicle stopped
along the side of a highway. The officer looks in and finds a woman lying
across the front seats, apparently asleep. If the officer rouses her and she
attempts to drive off, may the officer detain her? Should it matter if the
woman's behavior leads the officer to suspect her involvement in a crime?
Should it matter if the officer simultaneously suspects the woman of criminal
activity and thinks that she might be disoriented or in need of assistance?"
Should it matter if there is a child in the back seat?
Though the Court first referred expressly to the community-caretaking
doctrine more than thirty-five years ago,' 2 two fundamental questions raised by
the vignette have yet to be answered: First, what functions comprise
"community caretaking"? In other words, how do we know when this
exception to the warrant requirement applies? Second, what makes a
community-caretaking search "reasonable" or "unreasonable"?
This Article seeks to provide answers to those questions. In Part II, I
attempt to define community caretaking, drawing from cases where the police
engaged in searches that served purposes other than merely the investigation of
crime. 13 While courts have applied the label community caretaking to all
government activity for purposes other than law enforcement, a more nuanced
typology would better allow courts to analyze the differing interests that must
be balanced in each set of situations. This Article concentrates on "assistance
searches," a term coined here for that subset of community-caretaking activity
designed to help members of the public. Such searches present concerns about
9. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817, 819 (1996) (referring to probable
cause as the "traditional justification" and "traditional common-law" justification for searches
and seizures (emphasis deleted)); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983) (defining probable
cause as "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place").
10. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1990) ("Reasonable suspicion.., is
dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30-31 (1968) (stating that reasonable suspicion
must be based on the facts of a particular situation, not an individual's hunch).
11. This scene, taken from Psycho (Universal Studios 1960), is considered in more detail
infra at notes 345-346 and accompanying text.
12. Cadyv. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,441 (1973) ("Local police officers ... frequently
investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in
what... may be described as community caretaking functions .... ").
13. Though the analysis applies to both searches and seizures, explicit reference to
seizures is omitted to avoid needless repetition. "Searches," therefore, will include all Fourth
Amendment activity unless context indicates otherwise.
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police discretion far different from those implicated by other forms of
community caretaking, such as inventory searches and drunk-driving
checkpoints.
Deciding that a particular search falls within the community-caretaking
doctrine is only the first step in assessing whether that search is constitutional.
The constitutionality of a particular community-caretaking search depends on
whether it was reasonable, as the Fourth Amendment uses that term. In Part IIn,
I examine the approaches that courts have taken to deciding the reasonableness
of community-caretaking searches, finding the two currently predominant
approaches unsatisfactory.
Part IV sets forth a new approach, distinguishing between community-
caretaking searches designed to assist the subject of the search (as in cases
where the police enter a house suspecting the occupant needs medical
attention)--what I term "first-party community caretaking"-and searches to
assist someone other than the subject of the search-what I call "third-party
community caretaking." This Article contributes to the literature by
recognizing explicitly what no court or commentator has as yet: There is no
"government interest" to be weighed in evaluating the reasonableness of first-
party community caretaking. Rather, such searches should be analyzed under
an implied-consent theory, which would permit a first-party community-
caretaking search only if the searching officer reasonably believed that the
subject of the search would desire assistance.
Part V considers which remedies are appropriate for unreasonable
community-caretaking searches and seizures. In particular, this Part discusses,
and criticizes, an approach favored by some courts and Professor Wayne
LaFave's leading treatise that would permit community-caretaking searches,
but would exclude any evidence found as the result of such action from any
subsequent trial of the person whose privacy was abridged by the search. Such
a rule, I argue, is inconsistent with the Court's longstanding refusal to suppress
evidence in the absence of a constitutional violation. The Article concludes,
therefore, that evidence should be suppressed only if the search is unreasonable
under the standards discussed in Part IV.
II. Defining "Community Caretaking"
Cady v. Dombrowski14 was the first Supreme Court case to refer
to"community caretaking functions" of police departments, and to
14. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) ("Where, as here, the trunk of an
automobile, which the officer reasonably believed to contain a gun, was vulnerable to intrusion
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define 15 the category as those activities "totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute."'16 Searches made in the performance of such functions, the Court held,
do not require warrants, and are subject to "only the general standard of
'unreasonableness' as a guide in determining" constitutionality. 17
In Dombrowski, the police, following standard procedures, entered a car to
secure a gun, and sought thereby to protect the public from the harm that could
result if someone else found the weapon. 8 Subsequent cases have extended the
doctrine to include all manner of conduct outside the crime-control paradigm,
such as sobriety checkpoints, border searches, drug testing, inventory searches,
and searches in public schools. 19 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has
established rules for determining the constitutionality of these searches. The
core of the community-caretaking doctrine, however-where police act to
protect or assist the public-has been left with little doctrinal guidance from the
Supreme Court other than the vague command of reasonableness.20
by vandals, we hold that the search was not 'unreasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.").
15. One can read Dombrowski not as defining community caretaking, but as giving an
example of one kind of community-caretaking responsibility. Under this reading, some
community-caretaking activities are "totally divorced" from law enforcement, while others are
more closely connected with it. "[Cady v. Dombrowski] was noting that many police-citizen
encounters have nothing to do with crime, not requiring that they must have nothing to do with
crime or else be illegal unless justified by probable cause or a reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal activity." People v. Cordero, 830 N.E.2d 830, 841 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(O'Malley, J., concurring); see also State v. Kramer, 750 N.W.2d 941, 947-50 (Wis. Ct. App.
2008) (arguing that community-caretaking cases in Wisconsin strayed from Fourth Amendment
law due to a misinterpretation of the Court's decision in Dombrowski). The far more common
reading, however, is that Dombrowski was defining community caretaking, not just giving an
example of it. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 144 (4th Cir. 2005) (defining
community caretaking as "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute" (quoting Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 44 1)).
As explained below, policy concerns argue for expanding the definition beyond those activities
"totally divorced" from law enforcement, regardless of whether such a definition is the best
reading of Dombrowski.
16. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441.
17. Id. at448.
18. See id. at 443 (finding the search necessary "to protect the public from the possibility
that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands").
19. See infra notes 188-215 and accompanying text (describing cases in which the
doctrine has expanded to include conduct outside of crime control).
20. Cf Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cin. L. REV. 47,
49 (1974) ("It is both regrettable and surprising that the courts have said so little of any
substance about the principles of the [Fourth A]mendment when they have considered and
reconsidered its application in different circumstances.").
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This Article concentrates on this central, but neglected, form of
community caretaking, and seeks to give content to the reasonableness
standard. Although the Supreme Court's cases in other areas of community
caretaking or "special needs" provide insight, the different contexts of searches
to help or protect the public call for a constitutional analysis specific to the
competing interests there at work.
The Court's definition in Dombrowski of community caretaking as
including activities "totally divorced from [law enforcement] ',21 ironically
coupled a realistic sense of policework as comprising a variety of law
enforcement and community-caretaking functions with a na'vetd that ignored
the very reason the police perform such diverse functions. Police act in a
community-caretaking capacity in part because they-like other public
servants-are employed to assist people and have the resources to do so, 2 2 but
also because the community-caretaking functions that police provide are not, in
fact, totally divorced from law enforcement.23
Indeed, one would be quite disappointed with lawmakers if there was such
a clean separation between community caretaking and law enforcement
24
because laws are written and enforced to protect the public. 25 Laws prohibiting
homicide, theft, drug use, and speeding-in fact, virtually all laws requiring or
prohibiting certain conduct-are in place because violations threaten the public
safety or welfare.26 Thus, one might think of law enforcement as the epitome of
21. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,441 (1973).
22. See DOROTHY GuYOT, POLCING AS THOUGH PEOPLE MAT'ER 37 (1991) (noting that
police are relied upon to perform community-caretaking functions in part because of their
"twenty-four-hour availability").
23. See Livingston, supra note 3, at 274, 286 (noting the difficulty of separating
community caretaking from law enforcement); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth
Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SuP. CT. REv. 87, 116 (1989) ("[T]he
fundamental difficulty in the Court's effort to identify the administrative search is that the
contrast between regulation and law enforcement is illusory.").
24. Community caretaking is a concept distinct from, but related to, "community
policing." The latter is "[a] model of policing that stresses a two-way working relationship
between the community and the police, in which the police become more integrated into the
local community and citizens assume an active role in crime control and prevention." WALKER
& KATz, supra note 3, at 532. See generally Colloquium on Community Policing, 90 CAL. L.
REv. 1415 (2002); David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 L. & SOC'Y
REv. 765 (2001); Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms
Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA.
L. REV. 1253 (2000).
25. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (noting that "law
enforcement involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective").
26. Moreover, laws that prohibit or require certain conduct and that are not supported by a
public purpose may be unconstitutional. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)
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community caretaking, rather than in contradistinction to it.27 Nevertheless, the
Court has concluded otherwise, and as a result the lesser requirements of the
community-caretaking doctrine apply when the police pursue purposes other
than law enforcement-most notably protecting public safety when no crime is
apparent, and also including such activities as checking on the elderly,
28
assisting stranded or ill motorists, 29 and checking to make sure that businesses
are secured at night.3°
Dombrowski's definition of community caretaking as the performance of
functions "totally divorced from [law enforcement]" might imply that police
activity fulfilling both a community-caretaking purpose and a law enforcement
one would not trigger the exception-neither purpose would be totally divorced
from the other.3' In fact, however, the Court has treated such mixed-motive
("The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce [ethical and moral
principles condemning homosexual conduct] on the whole society through operation of the
criminal law."); id. at 577 ("[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting
the practice." (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting))); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justificationsfor Lawmaking: Before and
After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2004) ("[S]ince the middle of the
twentieth century, the Court has never relied exclusively on an explicit morals-based
justification in a majority opinion that is still good law."). See generally H.L.A. HART, LAW,
LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
27. Cf Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93-94 (2003) (rejecting the argument that because
protecting the public is a purpose of the criminal justice system, sex-offender registration laws
are punitive).
28. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 3, at 272-73, 273 n.56 ("It is not uncommon for
police to intrude into the homes of elderly people in response to calls from anxious relatives
unable to locate them." (citing, inter alia, State v. Gocken, 857 P.2d 1074, 1081 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993))); id. at 278 ("Police routinely receive calls ... expressing concern about people
who have not been heard from over a period of time. These people are often elderly...
(citing JONATHAN RUBINsTEiN, CITY POLICE 91 (1973))).
29. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leonard, 663 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Mass. 1996) ("In our
view, Trooper Ford was doing his duty as he patrolled the highway to inquire whether the driver
of the automobile was ill or in some other kind of difficulty.").
30. See Livingston, supra note 3, at 273 n.57 (citing, inter alia, Banks v. State, 493
S.E.2d 923, 926 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that "officers who find an apparently closed
business unlocked during a normal security sweep may conduct a limited intrusion on the
business premises for the sole purpose of securing the area and ensuring no intruders are
present"), overruled by Calbreath v. State, 519 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)); State v. Myers,
601 P.2d 239, 243-44 (Alaska 1979) (holding that law enforcement may enter a business
premises without a warrant only when the premises is in danger and the owner would likely
consent).
31. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 931 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433,441 (1973)); see id. at 938 ("Any intention ofengaging in crime-solving activities will
defeat the community caretaking exception even in cases of mixed motives."). Note, however,
that Ray upheld a police entry into a residence to investigate an apparent burglary. See id. at
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searches and seizures as community caretaking. In inventory-search cases, for
example, the Court has stressed the community-caretaking purposes of securing
valuables, guarding against false claims of theft, and protection of the police
from dangerous items in the vehicle,32 but police are undoubtedly motivated at
least in part by the possibility that such searches will yield evidence.33
Similarly, when considering the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints, the
Court has focused on the community-caretaking purpose of protecting potential
victims of drunk driving, 34 but the law-enforcement motivation of catching
drunk drivers is manifest. Thus, in an ironic inversion of the language in
Dombrowski, the Court at times appears to apply the community-caretaking
doctrine unless the police activity is totally divorced from the protection of the
public.
But if the complexity of police activity makes it appropriate to extend the
community-caretaking doctrine to instances where community-caretaking
functions and law-enforcement functions are intertwined, the same complexity
threatens to undermine the Court's Warrant Clause and probable-cause
precedents. 35 If the general test of reasonableness were held to apply whenever
the police activity involved the protection of some portion of the public, then
there would be very little left of the warrant requirement because so few law-
enforcement activities are completely separate from community caretaking.
Police investigation of weapons possession, drug sales, and extortion, to name
only a few crimes, is designed to protect the public from the harm caused by the
violations, and yet the Court has generally required some measure of
individualized suspicion before permitting the police to interfere with suspects'
939 ("When officers act in their properly circumscribed caretaking capacity, we will not
penalize the People by suppressing evidence of crime they discover in the process."). Obviously
the officers were acting partially in a law-enforcement capacity, although the residents of the
home were not the ones suspected of committing the crime.
32. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (stating that local police
departments use a common set of procedures when impounding vehicles).
33. See United States v. Roberson, 897 F.2d 1092, 1096 (1 th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he mere
expectation of uncovering evidence will not vitiate an otherwise valid inventory search."
(quoting United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1179 (1 th Cir. 1982))).
34. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) ("No one can
seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the State's interest in
eradicating it.").
35. See State v. Ludes, 11 P.3d 72, 77 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) ("[W]e believe it somewhat
disingenuous for the State to pursue an investigatory function with a fall back position that the
stop was in the interest of public safety. If successful, the public safety stop would literally
emasculate the constitutional protection afforded a motorist's privacy under Terry [v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968)].").
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liberty.36 Mere protection of potential crime victims, then, cannot suffice to
place searches or seizures within the community-caretaking doctrine, at least
unless the threat appears particularly likely to materialize if not for official
intervention.
Thus, the Court has expanded community caretaking beyond instances
where law-enforcement concerns are completely absent, but has not applied the
doctrine so expansively as to encompass every instance where government acts
in part to protect the community. The vagueness surrounding the definition of
the community-caretaking category and the different standards governing the
constitutionality of different types of community-caretaking searches indicate
that more precision is needed. There is not a single community-caretaking
doctrine. Rather, there are several different community-caretaking doctrines,
but courts have not clarified the constitutional interests affected by those
different kinds of searches. This Article aims to fill that need by providing a
typology and analyzing the rules that should apply to the different categories.
III Current Approaches and Their Flaws
Where officers act for a purpose not relating to law enforcement-for
example, where someone's life is in danger but no crime is suspected-there
are two principal reasons to dispense with the warrant requirement: time may
not allow it, and there would be no probable cause to justify a warrant in any
event. Further, as then-Professor Debra Livingston has argued, the warrant and
probable-cause protections of the Fourth Amendment may be deemed
inapplicable to community caretaking because "the absence of a law-
enforcement motive often mitigates the harms associated with intrusions on
privacy for the purpose of criminal investigation. 3 7 Specifically, community-
caretaking searches may not damage the reputation of the party searched, and
may be briefer, less intrusive, and less likely to produce anxiety than are law-
enforcement searches.38
36. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,274 (2000) (holding that an anonymous tip did
not amount to reasonable suspicion that the suspect was carrying a gun, and therefore holding
the search and seizure of the suspect unconstitutional); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149
(1972) (holding that an informant's tip did provide reasonable suspicion that an individual was
carrying a gun).
37. Livingston, supra note 3, at 273.
38. See id. at 273-74 ("[T]he absence of a law enforcement motive often mitigates the
harms associated with intrusions on privacy for the purpose of criminal investigation." (citations
omitted)); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004) ("[I]nformation-seeking
highway stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove intrusive."); Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-
53 (1990) (finding checkpoints less intrusive than roving patrol stops); United States v.
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Community-caretaking entries are thus so different from traditional Fourth
Amendment activity that it is not entirely clear that the Amendment applies to
community caretaking at all. There remains no square holding by the Supreme
Court that entries for community-caretaking purposes constitute "searches,
3 9
and occasionally lower courts have concluded that if the police are not
"looking" to solve crime, they are not "searching" in the constitutional sense.4°
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-59 (1976) (suggesting that the regularized manner of
checkpoints makes them less intrusive on the public).
39. Cady v. Dombrowski reserved the question whether entries for community-caretaking
purposes constituted "searches," saying that it was unnecessary to decide whether only those
searches that invade a reasonable expectation of privacy and are accomplished "with the specific
intent of discovering evidence of a crime" would trigger application of the Fourth Amendment.
413 U.S. 433,442 n.t (1973) (emphasis added). Similarly, in South Dakota v. Opperman, the
Court noted, but did not decide, the open question whether inventories of impounded vehicles
are searches. 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.6 (1976).
40. Sce United States v. Maple, 334 F.3d 15, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[Tlhe anterior
question before any court is whether a search of any kind has occurred, and only after that
question is answered in the affirmative are we to consider the target's expectation of privacy."),
vacated in part on reh 'g, 348 F.3d 260 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Commonwealth v. Evans, 764 N.E.2d
841, 846 (Mass. 2002) (finding "that by requesting the defendant's license and registration, the
officer [did not] restrain[] the defendant through any physical force or authority"). Illinois had
treated community-caretaking activity as completely outside the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.,
People v. Murray, 560 N.E.2d 309, 311-12 (I11. 990) (claiming that community caretaking
does not "involve coercion or detention and therefore does not involve a seizure"), overruled by
People v. Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. 2006). But Illinois has recently clarified that the
community-caretaking purposes of police actions are relevant to the actions' reasonableness, not
whether they constitute searches or seizures. See Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d at 199 (claiming
community caretaking "is not relevant to determining whether police conduct amounted to a
seizure in the first place").
Several other cases may be read to state that community-caretaking searches and seizures
do not trigger Fourth Amendment protections, but those cases usually do not turn on such a
conclusion. See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 263 (I11. 2003) (describing
community-caretaking activity as "consensual"), overruled by People v. Harris, 886 N.E.2d 947
(I11. 2008); In re Clayton, 748 P.2d 401, 402 (Idaho 1988) ("[E]ven if Officer Moser's actions
amounted to a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, sufficient probable cause
existed to conclude the removal of the keys was reasonable under the circumstances."); People
v. Cordero, 830 N.E.2d 830, 839-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (O'Malley, J., concurring) (suggesting
the court in Gonzalez thought "seizures may be justified on community caretaking grounds").
Rather, they uphold community-caretaking activity as reasonable, but also say that the Fourth
Amendment is not implicated because the activity is neither a search nor a seizure.
Additionally, some cases make it rather tough to determine whether the police action was
legitimated because there was no search or because the search was reasonable. See, e.g., State v.
Schlueter, No. E2006-02365-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2166010, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App.
May 23, 2008) (holding that because the officer "was acting within his community caretaking
function when he activated the blue lights of his police cruiser and approached the appellant's
vehicle... the stop of the appellant was not illegal").
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has deemed the protections of the Fourth
Amendment applicable in certain types of community-caretaking cases, and it is
likely that the Court would apply the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard to all searches of areas as to which individuals have reasonable
expectations of privacy,41 regardless of the purposes underlying the searches.
42
In Michigan v. Tyler,43 for example, 44 the Court considered whether police and
firefighters had violated the Constitution when they entered a burned building
and located evidence of the defendant's arson. The Court held that the officials
had indeed "searched" the premises, concluding that "there is no diminution in
a person's reasonable expectation of privacy nor in the protection of the Fourth
Amendment simply because... [the official's] purpose is to ascertain the cause
of a fire rather than to look for evidence of a crime .... Most recently, in
Brigham City v. Stuart,46 the Court applied the reasonableness test in
concluding that a police entry into a home was justified by the need to
"prevent[] violence and restor[e] order," making no mention of the possibility
that there had been no search at all.47
Holding community-caretaking entries to a reasonableness standard makes
eminent sense from a policy perspective. In a way, the reasonableness standard
produces the perfect policy result, for only those searches that intrude on
41. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(concluding that a Fourth Amendment "search" occurs when the government intrudes on an area
where an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable'").
42. Cf United States v. Maple, 348 F.3d 260, 261-62 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("The United
States concedes that any deliberate governmental intrusion into a closed space-opening a door
or a closed compartment-is a search regardless of the reasons for the intrusion."); Poe v.
Commonwealth, 169 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) ("All courts that have considered the
community caretaking function have required, at a minimum, that the officer's actions must be
measured by a standard of reasonableness.").
43. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) ("In summation, we hold that an
entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the building, officials may remain there
for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze.").
44. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,40 (2000) (finding that the use
of a narcotics dog does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment); Mich. Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,450 (1990) (stating that when a seizure occurs, the court must
decide whether or not it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
45. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 506; see also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22 n.3 (1984)
(per curiam) (holding that a person retained a privacy interest in her home even after a suicide
attempt rendered her unconscious).
46. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (holding that "police may enter a
home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an
occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury").
47. Id. at 406.
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individual privacy without sufficient cause are unreasonable and thus
unconstitutional.48 A Fourth Amendment exemption for community caretaking
makes little sense in terms of protecting privacy; one's privacy is identically
breached whether the purpose of the search is criminal investigation or
community caretaking.49 Moreover, viewing community caretaking as outside
the Fourth Amendment would create a tremendous incentive for "helpful"
police to intrude into all manner of private spaces and situations, and the
Constitution would have no role in limiting such entries.50
Classifying community-caretaking entries as searches would also have the
advantage of treating searches and seizures similarly-both would be
determined irrespective of the officer's purpose. In Illinois v. Lidster,5i for
example, the Court required that temporary seizures of cars at a checkpoint be
"reasonable in context," even though the purpose of the checkpoint was not to
investigate the occupants of the stopped cars. 52 The common understanding-
and the historically understood meaning--of"seizure" does not require that the
action be undertaken for any particular purpose.53 The Supreme Court has held
that a seizure must be "willful" 54 -"the termination of freedom of movement
through means intentionally applied,"05 but "[a] seizure occurs even when an
48. See Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors
Amar and Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1133, 1133 (1998) ("It is mighty hard to argue with
reasonableness.... A 'one-size-fits-all' Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard seems to
offer the best of all worlds: An ability to have an expansive Fourth Amendment that can be
finely calibrated to meet the peculiarities of any situation.").
49. One kind of search may lead to the other, as in the situation where an officer
executing a community-caretaking function develops probable cause to believe evidence of a
crime is present. In such situations, it is the initial compromise of privacy that enables the
subsequent, more intrusive, police activity.
50. Cf Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007) ("Holding that the passenger in a
private car is not (without more) seized in a traffic stop would invite police officers to stop cars
with passengers regardless of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of anything illegal.").
51. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426-27 (2004) (holding that information-seeking
highway checkpoint stops are not presumptively unconstitutional, but rather the reasonableness
of such stops must be evaluated by balancing public and private interests).
52. Id. at 426; see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990)
("Petitioners concede, correctly in our view, that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a
vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.").
53. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) ("From the time of the
founding to the present, the word 'seizure' has meant a 'taking possession[.]"' (quoting 2 N.
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 67 (1828); 2 J. BOUVIER, A
LAW DICTIONARY 510 (6th ed. 1856); WEBSTER'S THIRDNEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2057
(1981))).
54. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989).
55. Id. at 597 (emphasis deleted); accord County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
843-44 (1998) (restating rule that a seizure occurs only when there is a governmental
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unintended person or thing is the object of the detention or taking. 56 If official
detentions of"unintended person[s] or thing[s]"07 qualify as seizures, afortiori
it would seem that official deprivations of intended persons-whether the
officer has a purpose grounded in community caretaking, law enforcement, or
his own curiosity-similarly qualify.
Once community-caretaking searches are determined to implicate the
Fourth Amendment, however, it is therefore necessary to determine what, in the
absence of probable cause and a warrant, makes such a search or seizure
reasonable. Though the formulations vary somewhat, most cases employ one
of two approaches to determining the reasonableness, and therefore the
constitutionality, of community-caretaking searches. First, many states use a
test of unadorned reasonableness.5 That is, courts simply will announce their
conclusion that a particular search or seizure is or is not reasonable. Some
formulations of this general reasonableness test announce that reasonableness
depends on balancing the private and governmental interests implicated by the
search, but will provide no guidance as to how that balance should be struck in
future cases.59 Second, several states restrict community caretaking to instances
where "emergency aid" is necessary, and uphold those searches that are
reasonable responses to such emergencies. 60  Both approaches are
unsatisfactory.
A. Balancing Tests and General Reasonableness
In the law-enforcement context, the Fourth Amendment's probable-cause
requirement 1 generally sets the balance between the public interest in the
potential discovery of crime, evidence, or a suspect against the privacy interests
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied).
56. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596; see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 256-57
(2007) (holding that automobile passengers are seized during traffic stops). But cf Claybrook v.
Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Brower in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000) for the contention that "authorities [cannot] 'seize' any person other than one who was a
deliberate object of their exertion of force").
57. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596.
58. See infra Part III.A (criticizing courts that make a general assessment of
reasonableness without any standardized process).
59. Id.
60. See infra Part III.B (examining those states that limit community caretaking to
emergency situations).
61. See generally Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-33 (2001); Maryland v. Buie,




that would be sacrificed by the intrusion. 62 In community-caretaking cases,
though, the balance may not be reduced to such relative clarity. As Whren v.
United States63 recognized, "detailed 'balancing' analysis [i]s necessary" in
evaluating the reasonableness of police actions that "involve[] seizures without
probable cause."64
Unfortunately, cases holding that community-caretaking searches must be
reasonable have been quite vague in defining that notoriously general term.65
Courts have announced that reasonableness requires that the government's
interest in undertaking the search outweigh the searched party's interest in
66being free from the interference with his or her privacy. But that "definition,"
of course, is not much more helpful than if a court announced, "a reasonable
search is one that we think was a good thing to do under the circumstances.,
67
In other words, a standard that asks only whether a search was reasonable is
meaningless without "some criterion of reason .... What is the test of reason
which makes a search reasonable?,
68
Content must be given to this reasonableness standard if the community-
caretaking doctrine is to be applied consistently by courts and if police are to be
62. See Whren v. Unites States, 517 U.S. 806, 816-19 (1995) (explaining that for a traffic
stop, the existence of probable cause normally "outbalances" the private interest in avoiding
police contact).
63. See id. at 819 (holding that a temporary police detention of defendant upon probable
cause to believe he violated traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
64. Id. at 818.
65. See, e.g., Lockhart-Bembery v. Sauro, 498 F.3d 69, 75 (1 st Cir. 2007) ("The ultimate
inquiry is whether, under the circumstances, the officer acted 'within the realm of reason.'...
Reasonableness does not depend on any particular factor; the court must take into account the
various facts of the case at hand."); State v. Diloreto, 850 A.2d 1226, 1234 (N.J. 2004)
(requiring community caretaking searches to be "objectively reasonable under the totality of
circumstances").
66. See, e.g., State v. Mireles, 991 P.2d 878, 881 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (explaining
Idaho's totality-of-the-circumstances test, which weighs "'the public need and interest furthered
by the police conduct against the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the privacy of the
citizen"' (quoting State v. Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990))).
Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV.C, infra, weighing a "government interest" against an
individual's privacy interest makes little sense when the government's interest is to protect the
very individual whose privacy is invaded.
67. See, e.g., State v. Wixom, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Idaho 1997) (explaining that police
intrusion must be "reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances" (quoting State v.
Waldie, 893 P.2d 811, 814 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995))).
68. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see
also Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 677, 712 (1998) ("[W]hen the Court states that an officer acted reasonably
(appropriately), the Court has announced its ultimate conclusion, not a methodology or
perspective from which to assess constitutionally reasonable searches.").
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expected to comply with its strictures.6 9  A malleable standard in Fourth
Amendment cases presents a particular danger that it will be practically difficult
to declare unreasonable a search that has resulted in the seizure of evidence
proving a defendant's guilt.
70
Of course, the flexibility of a reasonableness standard is also its greatest
advantage, and it would be both impossible and unwise to catalogue in advance
all of the possible community-caretaking scenarios that might arise. Courts and
the police should be able to react differently when presented with different
facts, and such details as the weather and temperature; the traffic on a road
where the police find a disabled vehicle; the degree to which an ill or
intoxicated person is incoherent or disoriented; and the body position of
someone who might be sick, dead, or just sleeping in a car might be important
in assessing whether a police response would be appropriate. But no statute or
judicial doctrine could be written that would provide concrete guidance in cases
turning on those variables and countless others. Thus, the flexibility present in
69. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 370 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
criticizing the majority's use of a balancing approach to determine Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, Justice Brennan noted:
[T]he presence of the word "unreasonable" in the text of the Fourth Amendment
does not grant a shifting majority of this Court the authority to answer all Fourth
Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the social good....
[T]his Court has an obligation to provide some coherent framework to resolve such
questions on the basis of more than a conclusory recitation of the results of a
"balancing test."
1d; see also George M. Dery III, Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy Than
Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment
"Special Needs" Balancing, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 73 (1998) (offering a detailed critique of the
Supreme Court's context-sensitive "special needs" balancing approach used in certain Fourth
Amendment cases).
70. See, e.g., WILLIAMT. Pizzi, TIALS WrHOUT TRUTH 39 (1999) ("When the crime isa
serious one and the consequences of suppression would mean that the guilty person will go free,
judges are tempted to credit testimony that they have good reason to believe has been
embellished, to avoid suppression."); Bacigal, supra note 68, at 707 ("Why did the Court choose
to empathize with the officers' plight while turning a deaf ear to [defendants']? The distasteful
answer may be that in the actual cases that reach the Court, the defendants usually are guilty of
some serious crime."); Stephen Markman, Six Observations on the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 425,428 (1997) ("When something less draconian than the exclusionary rule
is restored as a remedy for an unreasonable search and seizure, then the judiciary will be less
inclined to interpret the Fourth Amendment in the narrowest possible fashion in an effort to
avoid the application of the rule."); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment
Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881,884 (1991) ("Exclusion, unlike damages, may bias judges' after-
the-fact probable cause determinations by requiring that they be made in cases where the officer
actually found incriminating evidence."); cf United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 n.18
(1984) ("Limiting the application of the exclusionary sanction may well increase the care with
which magistrates scrutinize warrant applications.").
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a reasonableness standard has the advantage of allowing police and reviewing
courts to calibrate a response appropriate to each situation.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that the choice is between either a
rigid formalism that reduces reasonableness to a checklist containing detailed
instructions for every imaginable set of facts on the one hand, and
unconstrained police and judicial discretion on the other. Rather, a doctrine
that gives content to the reasonableness standard by focusing the inquiry on the
constitutional interests implicated by different types of searches promises to
give police and courts both the flexibility and the direction they need to protect
us and our liberty. Although some courts have attempted to explain the
reasonableness standard,7 1 no attempt has done much to focus the inquiry on
particular factors that will bring consistency to the field.
Some states use a three-part test of reasonableness, asking (1) whether a
search or seizure occurred, (2) whether the police conduct was "bona fide
community caretaker activity," and (3) whether the public need for the intrusion
outweighed the interests of the person subject to the search or seizure.72 But of
those three parts, only the last one is of any significance, and it provides no
information as to how that balance should be struck in an individual case. The
other two elements are strictly preliminary-no question of the reasonableness
of police activity is raised unless the Fourth Amendment is implicated by a
search or seizure, and the community-caretaking doctrine by definition simply
cannot apply unless there is some need other than law enforcement for the
police conduct.
73
Another formulation, used in Maryland and developed by the Tenth
Circuit, is more helpful. That standard permits community-caretaking seizures
where: (1) there are specific and articulable facts reasonably warranting the
action; (2) the government's interest outweighs the individual's interest in
being free of the seizure; and (3) the scope of the detention is no more severe
than necessary for its purpose.74 This approach has the advantage not only of
71. See Mireles, 991 P.2d at 881 (explaining that reasonableness is determined by
weighing the public need for police conduct against citizens' privacy interests).
72. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 543 (Iowa 2003) (providing the three-
part analysis required in community-caretaking cases (citing State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d
411, 414 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987))); see also State v. Ziedonis, 707 N.W.2d 565, 570 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2005) (reciting the three-part test for reasonableness and naming four factors to consider
when weighing the public need for intrusion against privacy interests).
73. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,441(1973) (defining community caretaking
as those activities "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence
relating to the violation of a criminal statute").
74. See Wilson v. State, 932 A.2d 739, 744-45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (articulating
the three-part test for when community-caretaking seizures are permissible (citing United States
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stating the relevant interests that must be balanced, but of specifying part of
what that balance entails-the police activity must be no broader than
necessary. Such a limitation suggests that if privacy interests can be overridden
when the police are acting for community-caretaking purposes, the police
activity must be designed to fulfill those purposes. Further, this standard
requires that the government officials be able to articulate reasons justifying the
search; hunches are insufficient.75
These attributes are commendable, but the formulation suffers from some
flaws. First, the "reasonably warranting" language in prong one seems to
duplicate the balance in prong two. Surely the articulable facts known to police
could reasonably justify a search only if they indicate that the balancing of
interests would make the entry constitutional. Second, and more important, the
test does nothing to indicate how that balance should be drawn. What kinds of
governmental interests matter, and how significant are they relative to privacy
or possessory interests of individuals? Are we to consider the particular
individual's interests, or those of a typical (innocent) person in that individual's
position? Third, prong two's balance has little utility when the government is
not trying to serve its interests or those of the community at large, but instead is
trying to protect the interests of the person who is searched. The three-part
Maryland/Tenth Circuit standard, therefore, can be improved.
B. Limiting Community Caretaking to Emergencies
The most influential standard76 for evaluating community caretaking
comes from the New York case of People v. Mitchell.77 That case, which
permitted a search of hotel rooms for a missing chambermaid who
ultimately was found murdered, established a three-part test for assessing
the reasonableness of "emergency" entries:
v. Gamer, 416 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005))), rev'd, 975 A.2d 877 (Md. 2009).
75. See Gamer, 416 F.3d at 1213 (explaining that, like an investigative detention, "a community
caretaking detention must be based on 'specific and articulable facts which... reasonably warrant [an]
intrusion' into the individual's liberty' (citations omitted)). See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
76. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TREATiSE ON THE FoURTH AMENDMENr
§ 6.6(a) n. 19 (4th ed. 2004) (listing courts that follow the three-point test set forth in People v. MAtchell,
347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976)).
77. See People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607,610-11 (N.Y. 1976) (finding that warrantless police
search of defendant's hotel room for missing hotel maid was justified by the emergency doctrine and thus
not in violation of the Fourth Amendment), abrogated by Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
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(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an
emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the
protection of life or property.
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and
seize evidence.
(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable
cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be
searched.78
The Mitchell test thus requires that the action be immediately necessary to
quell the emergency. Limiting the justification to "emergencies,"
"imminent" threats, or to situations where action is needed "immediately," 79
focuses attention on the question of timing: Is the harm to be avoided by
the action occurring at that very moment?
Several cases from other jurisdictions,
8° including Arizona,
81
828 485 86Colorado,82  Delaware,8 3  Florida,s4  Kansas, New Mexico,
78. Id. at609.
79. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) ("Numerous state and federal cases have
recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and
searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.").
80. Many of these cases are comipiled in Professor LaFave's treatise. See generally 3 LAFAvE,
supra note 76, § 6.6 n.19.
81. See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 686 P.2d 750, 760-61 (Ariz. 1984) (using the three-part Mitchell
framework to uphold trial court's finding that officers' warrantless entry into defendant's apartment did not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
82. See, eg, People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 479 (Colo. 2002) (finding that police officers'
warrantless entry into defendant's house was not justified by an immediate crisis, and thus emergency aid
exception did not apply).
83. See, e.g., Guererri v. State, 922 A2d 403, 406 (Del. 2007) (adopting the three-prong
formulation ofthe emergency aid exception and finding officers' warrantless entry into defendant's home
to be justified under that test).
84. See, e.g., Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274,282 (Fla. 2005) (applying a two-part test that asks
whether there were "reasonable grounds" to believe that medical attention was necessaryand whetherthere
were "reasonable grounds to connect the feared emergency to the" place searched); see also Zakrzewski v.
State, 866 So. 2d 688, 695 (Fla. 2003) (finding that, given the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement, defendant's attomey's choice not to file a motion to suppress evidence found during
a warrantless search did not render his assistance deficient). The absence of the second Mitchell factor
from Riggs's formulation is of no moment, as the Supreme Court would later hold officers' subjective
intent to be irrelevant in evaluating the constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of emergency
searches. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,404-O5 (2006) (explaining that an officer's subjective
intent is irrelevant when determining the constitutionality of an exigent circumstances search).
85. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 947 P.2d 1030, 1036-37 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (using three-prong
Mitchell test to find that emergency exception doctrine justified warrantless search of defendant's room).
86. See, e.g., Statev. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032,1044 (N.M. 2005) ("[The court] adopt[s] the Mitchell
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Nebraska, 7 North Dakota,8 Oregon, 9 and some federal courts9" follow the
Mitchell rule and do not permit police to search for community-caretaking
purposes unless they satisfy either the requirements of the emergency
doctrine,9' or unless the search fits within a specifically accepted special-needs
category, such as automobile inventories.
92
Mitchell's requirement of an "emergency," with a concomitant "immediate
need" for police action, has been repeated over and over, but is rarely applied
with teeth.93  People v. Molnar,94 another New York case, for example,
permitted the police to enter an apartment without a warrant to investigate the
test').
87. See, e.g., State v. Plant, 461 N.W.2d 253, 262 (Neb. 1990) (explaining that law
enforcement must prove a warrantless search was conducted under a three-part test resembling
that in Mitchell for the emergency doctrine to apply).
88. See, e.g., Lubenow v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r, 438 N.W.2d 528, 533 (N.D.
1989) (using Mitchell framework to find that officer's entry into defendant's garage did not
violate Fourth Amendment).
89. See, e.g., State v. Christenson, 45 P.3d 511, 514 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (applying the
emergency requirement under the state constitution, and distinguishing it from the Fourth
Amendment's community-caretaking doctrine); State v. Follett, 840 P.2d 1298, 1302 (Or. Ct.
App. 1992) (adopting a modified version of the Mitchell framework).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068, 1073-75 (9th Cir. 2005) (using the
three-part Mitchell test to uphold district court's finding that officers' warrantless search was
justified under the emergency doctrine); Martin v. City of Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1081-83
(9th Cir. 2004) (using three-part test to determine officers' warrantless entry did not violate
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir.
1986) (delineating a three-part "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement
similar to that in Mitchell).
91. Others apply closely related tests. See State v. Blades, 626 A.2d 273, 280 (Conn.
1993) ("A police officer's objectively reasonable belief that a person might be in need of
immediate aid or assistance will justify a warrantless entry."); State v. Rincon, 147 P.3d 233,
237 (Nev. 2006) (requiring "clear indicia of an emergency").
92. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d 385,387 (N.Y. 2003) (setting forth the basic
elements of a proper inventory search).
93. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537,543 (Iowa 2003) (holding that a stop of
a vehicle was constitutional because of "the interest of public safety and emergency aid" when
the officer had received a report that the passenger had taken "some pills" and been aggressive
toward a third party who was not in the vehicle); see also John F. Decker, Emergency
Circumstances, Police Responces, and Fourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 CRiM. L. &
CRiMiNOLOGY 433, 508 (1999) ("[W]hile [the requirement of an immediate need for the officer's
action] suggests there is an element of immediacy required in situations where the emergency
doctrine is applied, this requirement is not always strictly enforced." (citing United States v.
Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 537-39 (10th Cir. 1994))).
94. See People v. Molnar, 774 N.E.2d 738, 739 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that police entry
into defendant's apartment in response to a call alerting them to a "strange odor," which lead
them to discover a rotting body, satisfied the Mitchell test).
1504
POLICE PATERNALISM
source of a putrid odor.95 The odor was ultimately traced to a rotting corpse
that the lessee/murderer had stuffed in a closet.96 The court considered the
situation an "emergency '' 97 though time was obviously not as crucial as it was in
Mitchell; indeed, the police waited an hour before they entered Molnar's
apartment.98 As the Molnar court explained,
[n]ot all emergencies are the same. In some, a person's life may hinge on
the passage of mere seconds, demanding immediate police action. In
others, police must act with reasonable swiftness but their response need
not be calculated in seconds.... The appropriately measured response of
the police should not be declared illegal merely because they thoughtfully
delayed entry for a relatively brief time.
99
Molnar was absolutely correct about the reasonableness of the police
action-after all, the government could hardly force the other apartment
residents to tolerate the odor indefinitely.'1°  Nevertheless, Molnar is
unconvincing in its shoehorning of Molnar's facts into the emergency doctrine.
The defining feature of an emergency is urgency-the need for immediate
action.'0 ' We should not pretend that the police are presented with an
emergency requiring an "immediate need"'1 2 for help if the police can afford to
95. Id. at 742-43. Other nuisances should yield the same result. See United States v.
Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1524-25 (6th Cir. 1996) (permitting the police to enter a residence when
other attempts to contact someone to turn down loud music had failed). But see United States v.
Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding unconstitutional an entry to stop a
water leak, arguing that the only danger presented by the leak was a speculative risk of property
damage).
96. See Molnar, 774 N.E.2d at 738-39 (describing the manner in which the defendant
killed the victim and placed her body in a closet, only for it to be discovered by police the next
month).
97. See id. at 739-43 (rejecting defendant's argument that, as a matter of law, there was
no emergency to justify the officers' entry).
98. See id. at 739, 741 (describing how police debated various alternatives to warrantless
entry for about an hour before forcing their way into defendant's apartment).
99. Id. at 741-42.
100. See id. at 743 ("As defendant concedes, a public official would have been required to
enter the apartment at some point, regardless of whether that official could obtain a warrant.").
101. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Exigent
circumstances are situations where 'real immediate and serious consequences' will 'certainly
occur' if a police officer postpones action to obtain a warrant." (internal citations omitted));
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLuSH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED
741 (1993) (defining emergency as "an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the
resulting state that calls for immediate action"; "a pressing need" (emphasis added)).
102. See id. at 1129 (defining immediate as "occurring, acting, or accomplished without
loss of time" (emphasis added)).
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wait hours before taking action. 103 Community caretaking comprises more than
just dealing with emergencies, however. Police may act in a community-
caretaking capacity where an imminent threat to life, health, or property is
presenti 4 but community caretaking also encompasses far less time-sensitive
concerns where neither persons nor property would be placed in substantial
jeopardy by failing to act immediately. 105
Permitting the emergency exception to apply in circumstances where time
is not of the essence essentially causes the doctrine to revert to one of
generalized reasonableness.' 0 6  Without the emergency requirement, and
without the requirement of subjective good faith (which the Supreme Court
subsequently, in Brigham City v. Stuart, held not to be required in emergency
situations), 10 7 Mitchell's three-part test requires only (1) "reasonable grounds to
believe that there is a[] ... need for [police] assistance for the protection of life
103. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) (holding that a search occurring
after an emergency had been resolved could not be justified by the emergency); Thompson v.
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21 (1984) (following the holding in Mincey by declining to find that the
warrantless search of a murder scene falls within one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant
requirement); Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1971) (concluding that waiting
several minutes before entering a house "is not consistent with [the actions] of a man who
believes that wounded persons might be lying inside the house awaiting attention" and therefore
declining to apply the emergency exception); People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 480-81 (Colo.
2002) (holding unconstitutional an entry to a home occurring sixty to ninety minutes after the
discovery of a dead body).
104. See Livingston, supra note 3, at 227 (defining exigency as "something like 'a
compelling demand for immediate action"' (quoting H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 82
(1996))).
105. See State v. Gocken, 857 P.2d 1074, 1080 (1993) ("[T]he police may be required to
perform a warrantless search, not in response to an immediate emergency, but as part of their
function of protecting and assisting the public." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
106. See State v. Jones, 947 P.2d 1030, 1036-39 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (utilizing the
Mitchell test to analyze the applicability of the "emergency doctrine exception"). The court
opined:
While [Mitchell's] three-prong analysis will be of assistance in some cases, in most
instances, common sense will be the touchstone. Police entry to check on the
welfare of a person may not be used as a stratagem for circumventing the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. But if police appear truly to have
acted for the purpose of checking on a person's welfare, and their actions appear to
be reasonable under the circumstances, further analysis is unnecessary.
Id. at 1039; see also, e.g., Love v. State, 659 S.E.2d 835, 838 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding
the search of a residence upon discovering that its front door was ajar and when no one
responded to the officers' shouts, because there was a "reasonable basis for believing that... an
emergency [such as a burglary in progress or an injury to an occupant] existed").
107. See Brigham City v. Stuart 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) ("An action is 'reasonable'
under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action."' (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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or property," and (2) "some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to
associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched." 10 8 And because
we can hardly expect that prosecutors will invoke the community-caretaking
doctrine to defend a search of a place other than the one associated with the
threat to "life or property,"' 0 9 unhelpfully, Mitchell turns out to require only
"reasonable grounds" to believe that the official assistance is "need[ed]." 110
Professor John Decker has suggested just such a modification of
"immediate";"' delayed entries should be permissible, in his view, as long as
"there is a reasonable explanation for the officer's delay."" 
2
But if we are comfortable with the police taking community-caretaking
action simply because doing so is "reasonable," then we should not behave as if
limiting such entries to emergencies constrains (or should constrain) the police
behavior. Instead, we should determine what types of community-caretaking
behavior we consider reasonable, and constrain police discretion by means
adapted to that concern.
The emergency exception is not well adapted to concerns about
community caretaking. Rather, it is an outgrowth of the long-recognized
exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for crime-control
searches."l3 Police in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon or in reasonable fear of the
imminent destruction of evidence may act without a warrant," 4 but because the
police are acting to enforce the law, the exigent-circumstances exception
permits the police action only if the police have probable cause and an
exigency." 5 The exigency itself is insufficient.
108. People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976).
109. If the police did search a place unconnected to the community-caretaking goal, the
search would be unreasonable. In the terms offered in Part IV, infra, such a search would be
unlikely to "prevent or lessen the harm."
110. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609.
111. See Decker, supra note 93, at 508 ("Immediacy should not be construed as a set time
period within which the officer must act, rather, it should be assessed in the context of the
factual situation.").
112. Id.
113. See id. at 441-45 ("[W]hen the police act in response to an emergency, this action is
within their community caretaking function, and is not a variant of exigent circumstances, but,
like a border search or hot pursuit, is a separate exception to the Fourth Amendment.").
114. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (stating that "a warrantless
intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence,
or the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons
inside or outside the dwelling" (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (applying the exigent circumstances exception to authorize a search of an
apartment into which a bank robber had fled).
115. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,296 (1973) (upholding awarrantless search
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The justification for the exigent-circumstances exception is that the time
pressure makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. 16 Accordingly, in law-
enforcement circumstances, the warrant requirement should apply where the
police have the time to get one, but where there is an emergency, then no
warrant should be necessary. The time limitations inherent in an emergency or
exigent-circumstances requirement, then, are necessary in the law-enforcement
context because without them the warrant requirement would be a nullity. We
would be left with only the requirement of reasonableness, and though the
Court has emphasized the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment in
recent years, 17 it continues to require warrants as a general rule."l
8
In the community-caretaking context, however, we need not worry about
evading the warrant requirement because it would be impossible to obtain
traditional warrants based on probable cause in any event." 9  A lenient
where the police had probable cause to believe the evidence was being destroyed); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (requiring a "clear indication" that evidence would be
found to justify a warrantless blood test); 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 192 (4th ed. 2006) ("[A]lthough an exigency justifies
the absence of a search warrant, it does not dispense with any underlying requirement of
probable cause that exists.").
116. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,298-99 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment does
not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely
endanger their lives or the lives of others.").
117. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009) (holding that police may
search a vehicle without a warrant incident to an arrest if"it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of the arrest"); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct 695, 699
(2009) ("When a probable cause determination was based on reasonable but mistaken
assumptions, the person subjected to a search or seizure has not necessarily been the victim of a
constitutional violation."); Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604 (2008) ("[W]e have
analyzed a search or seizure in light of traditional standards of reasonableness 'by assessing...
the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and.., the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate government interests."' (citations omitted)); Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) ("'Under our general Fourth Amendment approach,' we
'examin[e] the totality of the circumstances' to determine whether a search is reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." (citations omitted)).
118. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ("'[W]arrants are generally
required to search a person's home or his person .... "' (citations omitted)); see also Thompson
v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984) ("[W]e have consistently reaffirmed our understanding that
in all cases outside the exceptions to the warrant requirement the Fourth Amendment requires
the interposition of a neutral and detached magistrate between the police and the 'persons,
houses, papers, and effects' of citizens." (citations omitted)).
119. Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (analyzing the reasonableness ofa search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment). The Court in Terry stated:
[T]he police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure .... But we deal here with an
entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-
the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not been,
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interpretation of "immediate" or "emergency" that requires only that
community-caretaking actions be reasonable simply recognizes that the Warrant
Clause has never been, and could never be, applicable in such situations.
1 20
Accordingly, courts should dispense with the emergency nomenclature and
focus on what reasonable means in the community-caretaking context.
Some courts do limit community caretaking to true emergencies. In
United States v. Bute, 21 for example, the Tenth Circuit cited the emergency
limit of the Mitchell test in refusing to permit a sheriffs deputy to enter a
commercial structure that had been left open at night.122 Similarly, State v.
Trudelle123 declined to apply the exception to a warrantless entry of a
methamphetamine lab despite the potential safety threats caused by the
chemicals.12 4 Michigan even refused to permit police to enter a motel room to
ensure the safety of occupants after a shots-fired report identified that room or
one other as the source of the shots. 125 Kansas restricts public safety stops of
vehicles to situations presenting "clear, urgent, and immediate" danger, 26 and
has applied that rule to invalidate a stop where police received a tip that a
motorist had injected something into his arm, but where the motorist did not
appear to be driving erratically.
27
and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead,
the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id.
120. See id. (recognizing police action conduct "which historically has not been, and as a
practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure").
121. See United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 539 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the open
door of a commercial building at night did not constitute an emergency rising to an exception to
the warrant requirement).
122. See id. ("We simply cannot accept the notion that an open door of a commercial
building at night is, in and of itself, an occurrence that reasonable and objectively creates the
impression of an immediate threat to person or property as to justify a warrantless search of the
premises.").
123. See State v. Trudelle, 162 P.3d 173, 184-85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (deciding that a
methamphetamine lab, despite potential dangers of all such labs, did not rise to the level of an
emergency exception to the warrant requirement).
124. See id. ("Although they expressed a concern about safety with regard to meth labs in
general, the officers did not have any credible and specific information about possible victims
inside of Defendants' home. Absent such specific information, the officers were not entitled to
enter as community caretakers.").
125. See People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910,921-22 (Mich. 1993) (noting that "the police
had no warrant and no probable cause" as well as no "specific and articulable facts" suggesting
"that a person within room 33 was in need of immediate aid"; therefore, "entry into defendant's
room violated the Fourth Amendment").
126. State v. Tucker, 878 P.2d 855, 861 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
127. See, e.g., State v. Ludes, 11 P.3d 72, 77 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) ("Because the caller's
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Such strict interpretations of "emergency" can cause problems, however,
as police may not know there is an immediate need for their assistance until it is
too late for their assistance to be effective, or until a minor situation has grown
into a crisis. Police should not have to allow an apartment's gas leak to
threaten the whole block, or wait until a water leak causes a floor to collapse,
before entering a dwelling.1 28 At the same time, not every situation that could
conceivably become a catastrophe is cause for the police to take action.
1 29
The Supreme Court's discussion of emergency entries in Brigham City v.
Stuart is instructive. There, the Court rejected the idea that the police needed
to wait until the need for action was grave, and countered that police could
more effectively serve the community by preventing injury than by providing
help only after damage had been done: 130 "The role of a peace officer includes
preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to
tip was so lacking in details and [the officer] did not observe any behavior which would indicate
immediate danger to Ludes or the public, it cannot be held the stop was justified under the guise
of a safety stop."). Other times, however, Kansas has adopted a flexible approach to its public-
safety exception. See State v. Jones, 947 P.2d 1030, 1039 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (citing
"common sense" as the "touchstone" and reading Mitchell to require only that the officer act
"reasonably under the circumstances").
128. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 338 F.3d 623, 628 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding
police entry into an unlocked, unoccupied vehicle when the officer observed a handgun inside);
State v. Stanberry, No. 2002-L-028, 2003 WL 22427922, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2003)
(finding unconstitutional the search of a hospitalized man's home for burning candles after
officers noticed some candles dripping wax onto the floor). Certainly the situation in Bishop
could have developed into an emergency if someone had taken the gun from the vehicle.
Nevertheless, and despite the Sixth Circuit's contrary conclusion, it is indisputable that the
situation facing the officer did not then present an immediate threat to public safety. So long as
the vehicle was unoccupied, and so long as the officer was at the scene, the handgun was not
going to injure anyone. See id. at 638 (noting that the danger arose from someone approaching
the vehicle and picking up the handgun, not from the unattended handgun itself). The officer's
action was reasonable-the intrusion on privacy by opening an unlocked car door was minimal,
and the potential gain in terms of public safety was substantial. The police should not have had
to guard the car until the owner returned. Cf Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,447 (1973)
(holding that the removal of a weapon from a car was reasonable, even though police could have
neutralized the danger by posting a guard there). And reasonableness is all that should be
required. Additional emergency requirements tend to result in a curiously lenient application of
the emergency standard.
129. See United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Even ifa water
leak that could potentially cause damage to a new carpet could be considered an emergency, the
additional time it would have taken to obtain a search warrant was marginal .... Such risk was,
at best, speculative."). In Williams, the court disapproved the warrantless entry. Id. at 504.
130. As Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley eloquently put it, "[t]he policeman isn't there to
create disorder, the policeman is there to preserve disorder." THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS,
supra note 8, at 183.
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casualties; an officer is not like a boxing (or hockey) referee, poised to stop a
bout only if it becomes too one-sided."'
13 1
The necessity or "choice-of-evils" defense in criminal law features the
same debate about the need to limit its scope to situations where action is
needed immediately. Jurisdictions interpreting the necessity defense are split
on whether the defense carries an implicit time limitation-that is, whether the
necessity defense is restricted to those actions combating an imminent harm.
Some states require the actor to respond to an "imminent" threat 132 or an
"emergency," 133 while others require that the actor's conduct be "immediately
necessary."' 134 Still others, and the Model Penal Code, require only that the
action be "necessary."'
' 35
The rationale for a time limit is that people should violate criminal
prohibitions-even when defending oneself or others-only as a last resort.136
Thus, the defendant is justified only when we are certain that the harm sought
to be avoided would have occurred but for that behavior. If the harm is to
occur in the future, perhaps another way of avoiding the harm will become
available, and the defense should not apply. 137 The better rule, however, is that
strict time limits are unnecessary and potentially harmful, for certain dangers
may be prevented only in advance of the threat's materialization.138 Requiring
131. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,406 (2006); see also United States v. York, 895
F.2d 1026, 1030 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding a search to neutralize a person who was drunk and
threatening children as reasonable despite the fact that no actual violence had yet been done);
MATr LEAF, USA HOcKEY INTERMEDIATE OFFICIALS MANUAL 58 (7th ed. 2005) ("Enter together
[with your partner], when the fight slows down or one player gains an advantage ....
[C]ommunicate with player to calm him/her down or make him/her feel better ('nice fight' or
'you definitely got the better of him/her this time').").
132. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 410 (1997) ("Many statutes require that the
threat of harm must be 'imminent' in order to entitle the actor to act under a lesser-evils
defense.").
133. See id. at410 n.8 ("Requiring that the actor's conduct benecessaryasan 'emergency'
measure, as is sometimes done, leads to the same results as the imminent-threat requirement.").
134. See id. at 410-11 ("Some necessity statutes require that the actor's conduct be
'immediately necessary."').
135. See id. at 407 ("[A]n actor is justified if his conduct is: 'Necessary to avoid a harm to
himself or to another.... ."' (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(l)(a) (2008)).
136. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVECRIMINALLAW 131 (2d ed. 2003) ("Perhaps
this is but a way of saying that, until the time comes when the threatened harm is immediate,
there are generally options open ... other than the option of disobeying the literal terms of the
law.").
137. See id. ("It is sometimes said that the defense of necessity does not apply except in an
emergency .... ).
138. See ROBINSON, supra note 132, at4l1-12 ("The'immediatelynecessary'requirement
would seem always to force an actor to delay, rather than leaving it for ajury to decide whether
it was reasonable under the circumstances to reduce the risk of the harm by acting earlier."
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that the actor's response be necessary suffices to limit the defense, without
adding the limitation of immediacy.139 Where another solution is truly likely to
materialize, then the defendant's actions are not necessary; if they are
necessary, then it should make no difference whether the defendant sought to
avoid a harm that was to occur in two seconds or two weeks.
40
Likewise, in community-caretaking situations, requiring that the police
action be objectively reasonable through a balancing of the interests involved
ensures that police action that unnecessarily interferes with privacy rights will
not trigger the exception.141 An appropriate balance should seek to preserve the
emergency doctrine's advantage of prohibiting the police from acting when
another, substantially less intrusive means would be as effective, without
preventing the police from acting where their help is beneficial but no danger is
immediately apparent. 42 Additionally, to the extent that a requirement of
present danger is necessary to guard against pretext, 143 a test that overtly
prohibits pretextual community caretaking with regard to non-emergencies-as
this Article proposes in Part IV, infra-would be more closely tailored to that
interest.
IV. Different Types of Community-Caretaking Cases
All community-caretaking cases are incompatible with Fourth Amendment
requirements of warrants and probable cause. One might suggest, therefore,
that community-caretaking activity is unconstitutional if it involves a
governmental intrusion into an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.
(citations omitted)).
139. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (2008) (requiring only "that the actor believes [the
conduct] to be necessary to avoid the harm or evil to himself or to another").
140. See id, (requiring only subjective belief that conduct is necessary to avoid harm).
141. See State v. Maddox, 54 P.3d 464, 468 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) ("Officer Reyes' basis
for the stop was speculative and anticipatory, a concern about something that might happen if
Maddox himself did not perceive the danger .... Community caretaking justifies a detention
only if there is a present need for assistance.").
142. But cf Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973) (requiring that courts grant
officers considerable discretion concerning the manner in which they address a public safety
issue). Necessary, then, does not always translate to "least restrictive means"; rather, the option
available to-but not utilized by-police would be relevant to the question of whether the
action taken was reasonable or not. For further discussion on this point, see infra Part IV.
143. See Maddox, 54 P.3d at 468 ("Allowing ... community caretaking stops whenever
[officers] anticipate that a citizen might be about to embark upon an unwise venture would
present far too great an opportunity for pretextual stops and far too great an imposition on the
privacy interests of our citizenry.... ").
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Such a broad attack on community caretaking, however, is both inconsistent
with precedent and unwise.
Consider the following situation: A police officer walking down the street
hears a crash coming from inside a nearby home. He sees through a window an
individual prone on the floor at the foot of a staircase. There is no sign of foul
play; by all indications the unfortunate person just slipped on the stairs.
Nobody responds to his knock on the door, and the individual remains
motionless. If the officer or other rescue personnel were not permitted to enter
without a warrant or probable cause, the individual would be denied obviously
needed assistance.
Certainly this example presents a dramatic and rare situation. But if we
are to permit the officer to enter in such a situation, the community-caretaking
doctrine must have some applicability; police must sometimes be able to invade
a person's reasonable expectation of privacy without a warrant or probable
cause. The area of dispute then becomes when, not whether, such entries are
appropriate-in Fourth Amendment terms, what makes such entries
reasonable?
An assessment of reasonableness should turn on the interests at play in
different kinds of community-caretaking searches. But though different kinds
of community-caretaking searches can be identified, there has been no attempt
to formulate a framework within which each kind of community caretaking can
be analyzed. The framework that follows begins by focusing the discussion on
police attempts to help members of the public by separating from consideration
areas of community caretaking as to which the Supreme Court has already
provided significant direction concerning the factors making such searches
reasonable: searches justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
144
emergencies, 145 "special-needs" searches, 146 and searches of items in the
government's possession. 47 The prescriptive focus of this Article is not on
144. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (noting that in the context of
an investigatory stop falling short of arrest, the "Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's
action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity 'may be afoot"'
(citations omitted)).
145. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ("[L]aw enforcement
officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured
occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.").
146. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) ("[W]e have permitted
exception [to the warrant requirement] when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable."' (citations
omitted)).
147. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976) ("[T]his Court has
consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful
police custody where the process is aimed at securing or protecting the car or its contents.").
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those areas, but they do provide insight-by analogy and by contrast-as to
what should make assistance searches reasonable.
-A. Lessons from Related Areas of Established Fourth Amendment Law
"The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government
officials."'148 The Supreme Court has occasionally permitted exceptions to this
general principle, 149 but throughout at least the last half-century it has used the
Fourth Amendment to control police discretion' 50 and minimize the opportunity
for police to target certain individuals for abusive invasions of privacy. 15'
148. Id. at 377 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) ("The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure
powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with
the privacy and personal security of individuals." (citations omitted)); Wesley MacNeil Oliver,
With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial
Profiling, 74 TULANE L. REv. 1409, 1412 (2000) ("Permitting an officer standardless
discretion... runs afoul of [the Fourth] Amendment, which is designed to prevent placing 'the
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."' (citations omitted)).
149. See cases cited supra notes 144-47 (showing examples of Supreme Court-sanctioned
exceptions to the warrant requirement).
150. Professor Maclin has identified "control[ling] police discretion" as "the central
premise of the Fourth Amendment." Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment
is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994); see also Thomas Y. Davies,
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,578-83 (1999) (explaining
the Framing era's antipathy to discretionary law enforcement); Tracey Maclin, The Central
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 201 (1993) ("[T]he central
meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power and discretion.").
151. Limiting official discretion is a prominent theme in other areas of the law as well.
Due process protection against vague laws is one notable example. See, e.g., City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) ("Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two
reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to
understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement."); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 n.15 (1987)
(concluding that the law at issue "effectively grants police the discretion to make arrests
selectively on the basis of the content of the speech"); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983) ("[The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." (emphasis
added)); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (disapproving a law
with "no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted" to police because it
"permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law"); Connally v.
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (holding that a law is unconstitutionally vague
when one "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning").
A second example of the theme of limiting official discretion is the First Amendment
protection against discretionary licensing schemes for speech. See, e.g., Forsyth County v.
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Accordingly, the Court has attempted to give content to the Fourth
Amendment's general requirement of reasonableness by creating a series of
rules for determining the constitutionality of some searches for non-law-
enforcement purposes, such as protecting the public from the threats caused by
drunk drivers1 52 and protecting police from potential dangers posed by
impounded cars or arrested persons. 153 These rules allow the police and the
public to know which searches and seizures are going to be treated as
"reasonable," without resorting to the unpredictability of a case-by-case
elucidation of the Constitution's meaning.
54
This Article seeks to isolate a subset of community-caretaking activity as
yet uncovered by such rules: Those police actions designed to assist the public
deal with a present or future problem. To do so, however, it is necessary to
specify those areas that are not the focus of this Article's prescriptions, and to
assess the ways in which the doctrine from those areas can inform the
constitutional questions surrounding assistance searches.
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) ("[G]ovemment, in order to regulate
competing uses of public forums, may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a
march, parade, or rally... [but] [i]t may not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a
government official." (citations omitted)); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486
U.S. 750, 757 (1988) ("[The mere existence of the licensor's unfettered discretion, coupled
with the power of prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the
discretion and power are never actually abused."); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147, 150 (1969) (disapproving a regulatory ordinance conferring "virtually unbridled and
absolute power to prohibit" speech on a public official); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,295
(1951) ("It is sufficient to say that New York cannot vest restraining control over the right to
speak on religious subjects in an administrative official where there are no appropriate standards
to guide his action."); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948) (holding an ordinance
unconstitutional in part because it contained "no standards prescribed for the exercise of [the
authority's] discretion").
152. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (explicating the requirements
for conducting a valid warrantless blood test when an officer suspects drunk driving).
153. See United States v. Bishop, 338 F.3d 623, 628 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding police
entry into an unlocked, unoccupied vehicle when the officer observed a handgun inside); see
also Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (stating that "a warrantless intrusion may be
justified by... the risk of danger to police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling").
154. See Livingston, supra note 3, at 267 ("These exceptions, however, must be
categorical, rather than case-by-case, so that police are not left to make ad hoc assessments of
reasonableness .... ."); cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969) (criticizing a view
of reasonableness resting only on "a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts
of police conduct"). See generally Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1471 (1985) (discussing the "no lines" and "bright line" approaches to the
Fourth Amendment).
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1. Objective Requirements of Reasonableness
Searches to detect violations of administrative codes-like searches to
detect violations of the criminal law-are reasonable only if the searching
official obtains a warrant.' Administrative search warrants, however, may be
issued without individualized suspicion that the search is going to turn up
evidence of a violation; 56 it is enough that the location of the search be chosen
by non-discretionary means. 157 Special-needs searches, by contrast, do not
require warrants of either the traditional type or the administrative variety. 58
They must, however, be performed in accordance with standard procedures.'
59
This subsection analyzes whether assistance searches should be similarly
limited by a requirement that police either obtain a warrant or operate according
to standard procedures.
Most obviously, police do not need to rely on the community-caretaking
doctrine to justify searches that are supported by warrants or where an
exception to the warrant requirement for law-enforcement searches applies.
Such searches may have community-caretaking goals, such as the protection of
crime victims or the general public, but there is no need to use the community-
caretaking doctrine to limit officers' discretion in such a circumstance; the
warrant, probable cause, and reasonable-suspicion requirements are used in the
law-enforcement context to serve precisely that purpose.
The warrant requirement provides the quintessential restraint on police
discretion. By holding that the constitutionality of a search must ordinarily be
decided ex ante "by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
155. See Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523,533 (1967) ("We simply
cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in [the
administrative search] context .... ).
156. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,624 (1989) ("[W]here the
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of
individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.").
157. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973) (disapproving a
search "conducted in the unfettered discretion of the members of the Border Patrol" because it
"embodied precisely the evil the Court saw" when it "insisted that the 'discretion of the official
in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant" (citations omitted)).
158. See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,75 n.7 (2001) ("[I]n limited circumstances, a
search unsupported by either warrant or probable cause can be constitutional when 'special
needs' other than the normal need for law enforcement provide sufficient justification."
(citations omitted)).
159. See id. at 84-85 (differentiating between a constitutionally compliant "duty to provide
the police with evidence of criminal conduct that [hospitals] inadvertently acquire in the course
of routine treatment" and an inappropriate "undertak[ing] to obtain such evidence from their
patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients" (emphasis added)).
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enforcement agent,"' 60 the Court has shown its resolve that evaluating a
search's reasonableness after the fact presents an unconstitutionally high risk
that too many unreasonable searches will occur. As the Court has reasoned, the
warrant requirement was imposed "so that an objective mind might weigh the
need to invade.., privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was
deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the
detection of crime and the arrest of criminals."'16 1 Thus, in those circumstances
where a warrant is required, searches that are reasonably executed1 62 and based
on probable cause are nonetheless unconstitutional if a magistrate has not
authorized the search ahead of time. 1
63
Even where a warrant exception applies, probabie cause and reasonable
suspicion limit officer discretion by reducing the number of people who may
lawfully be the subject of a search. In Whren v. United States, the Court not
only held that the Fourth Amendment imposes no bar to an officer's
discretionary and pretextual enforcement of traffic laws so as to investigate a
hunch about criminal activity, but it also took pains repeatedly to stress that the
stop in that case was reasonable because the police had probable cause to
believe the driver had violated the traffic laws. 164 It acknowledged language in
cases involving inventory searches
165 and administrative inspections 16
6
160. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
161. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
162. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (holding that a knock-and-
announce requirement is contained within the Fourth Amendment's requirement of
reasonableness).
163. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,587-88(1980) (holding that an arrest in one's
home "'is simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence
of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and when
probable cause is clearly present"' (citations omitted)).
164. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) ("Not only have we never held,
outside the context of inventory search or administrative exception... that an officer's motive
invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have
repeatedly held and asserted the contrary." (citations omitted)); see also Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (upholding an arrest in which there was probable cause to believe the
person committed a crime, even where the officer incorrectly thought that there was probable
cause to believe that the suspect committed a different crime); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128, 137-39 (1978) (holding subjective intentions irrelevant in the context of a search held
reasonable and supported by probable cause).
165. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 ("'[A]n inventory search must not be a ruse for a general
rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence."' (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,
4 (1990))); see also United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 241 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding
subjective intentions irrelevant in the context of a search held reasonable and supported by
probable cause).
166. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 (acknowledging previous mention of an apparent "no
pretext requirement" (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27 (1987))).
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condemning "bad faith"'167 pretextual police actions, but distinguished that
language on the ground that the searches and seizures involved in those earlier
cases were "conducted in the absence of probable cause."
168
Thus, Whren does not foreclose an inquiry into an individual officer's
purpose as part of the reasonableness test for assistance searches, which are also
necessarily "conducted in the absence of probable cause."' 69  While the
Supreme Court has attempted to avoid inquiring into subjective purpose in
other Fourth Amendment contexts,1 70 in those instances the police either
possessed probable cause, as in Whren, or were presented with an emergency,
as in Stuart, which permitted police to enter a house to stop an ongoing threat
of serious physical injury.' 7 1 In nonemergency community-caretaking cases,
however, the police discretion is greater than in either of those situations. An
officer could intrude into individuals' private areas or interfere with their
freedom of movement, ostensibly to offer a motorist directions or check on the
health of an individual suspected of drug use, etc., even if the officer is trying
to obtain evidence to use against the subject of the search.
167. Id. (noting the apparent significance of there being no indication in Bertine of"bad
faith" or a "sole purposed of investigation" (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372
(1987))).
168. Id.; see also id. at 817 (holding the balancing test of Prouse inapplicable because that
case "involve[d] [a] police intrusion without the probable cause that is its traditional
justification." (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979))).
169. Id. at 811; see United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that a subjective community-caretaking purpose was required); State v. Mountford,
769 A.2d 639, 645 (Vt. 2000) (same).
170. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400,2408-09 (2007) (preferring to focus
on "the intent of the police as objectively manifested [rather than] the motive of the police for
taking the intentional action" and noting that the Court has "repeatedly rejected attempts to
introduce this kind of subjectivity into Fourth Amendment analysis"); Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398,404 (2006) ("An action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless
of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
justify [the] action."' (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978))); Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554
(1980) (establishing an objective standard for evaluating seizures: Whether, "in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave").
171. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 402 ("We granted certiorari ... in light of differences among state
courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard
governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation." (emphasis added));
see also United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 66 & n. 1 (1 st Cir. 2004) (concluding that the




True, Whren permits officers to stop motorists observed violating the law,
and violations occur so frequently that virtually every driver could be stopped
on a pretext. 172 Nevertheless, the discretion provided in Whren is limited in
two important respects. First, under Whren, officers can interfere with the
freedom of individuals only if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe
that there has been a violation of the law. 73 Even though in practical terms
violations of the traffic laws are common, a driver who complies with the law
has nothing to fear under Whren.' 74 By contrast, a motorist whose behavior is
legal but might be indicative of distress could be subject to a community-
caretaking seizure.
171
Second, the discretion accorded officers under Whren, because of the
universality of violations, applies only to traffic infractions.1 76 Drivers may
speed and roll through stop signs regularly, but violations of law are much less
frequent off-road. Allowing searches whenever officer assistance might
reasonably be thought helpful would permit police to interfere with all aspects
of citizens' lives, from unloading groceries to dealing with a crying baby.
Where individualized suspicion of crime is absent, searches may still be
reasonable, provided that the searching officers are not permitted to exercise
discretion as to what or whom to search. This discretion-limiting requirement
172. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 816 ("[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to
decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that
infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement.").
Similarly, in Engquist v. Oregon Department ofAgriculture, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008), all nine
Justices agreed that an individual could not successfully bring a class-of-one claim under the
Equal Protection Clause against an officer who stopped the plaintiff for speeding when there
was no reason to distinguish the plaintiff from dozens of other speeders. See id. at 2154
("[A] llowing an equal protection claim on the ground that a ticket was given to one person and
not others, even if for no discernible or articulable reason, would be incompatible with the
discretion inherent in the challenged action."); see also id. at 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If
there were no justification for the arrest, there would be no need to invoke the Equal Protection
Clause because the officer's conduct would violate the Fourth Amendment. But as noted, a
random choice among rational alternatives does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.").
173. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 ("[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.").
174. Id.
175. See State v. Macelman, 834 A.2d 322,326 (N.H. 2003) ("The officer's observation of
a car poised at the edge of the defendant's property .... [provided the officer with] 'reasonable
grounds' to believe the reported emergency existed, and to enter the backyard to conduct further
investigation.").
176. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996) (noting that the
"[tiemporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if
only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons"' and "is
thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be unreasonable under the circumstances"
(emphasis added)).
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is demonstrated by the Court's treatment of administrative searches and
"special needs" searches, including searches of items that come into police
possession, such as impounded vehicles. 1'7
The Supreme Court has permitted suspicionless searches to ensure
compliance with administrative codes, but has required the officials to obtain
warrants. 78 In addition to failing the usual Fourth Amendment requirement of
probable cause based on individualized suspicion of criminal activity, such
warrants cannot specify the "persons or things to be seized., 1 79 The Court,
however, announced that warrants could authorize reasonable searches of
businesses to ensure compliance with regulatory standards, requiring only that
the officer's discretion be appropriately limited by, for example, choosing the
target of the search by standardized means, rather than by a selection method
that left the official free to harass those people or businesses he or she
disliked.
80
A similar warrant could be required for community-caretaking entries.
The officer would need to show that an established procedure was followed and
that the officer was not choosing to search this particular location because of a
vindictive motive or because the officer had a hunch that criminal activity
would be discovered. As with all warrant requirements, this one would have
the advantage of limiting the officer's desire to search by requiring preapproval
of the search by a "neutral and detached" magistrate who could evaluate and
177. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (stating that "the officer
does not make a discretionary determination to search based on a judgment that certain
conditions are present," but rather searches "in accordance with established policy department
rules or policy and occur whenever an automobile is seized").
178. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1977) (holding that the
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 651 etseq. (2000 & Supp. V 2005)) was unconstitutional insofar as it allowed agents
to search work areas without a warrant); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-40 (1967)
(concluding that a tenant had a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to demand a
warrant before city housing inspectors entered his dwelling to ensure that it complied with fire
safety standards).
179. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Camara said that the administrative warrants it authorized
did satisfy the probable-cause requirement, but in doing so it did not apply the probable-cause
standard applicable in other contexts. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. As applicable to
administrative searches, probable cause "must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling."
Id.; see also id. at 539 ("[R]easonableness is still the ultimate standard. Ifa valid public interest
justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted
search warrant.").
180. See id. at 538 ("Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being
enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multifamily
apartment house), or the condition of the entire area[] .... ).
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weigh the individual's privacy interest.' 81 Of course, if the exigencies of time
prevent an officer from obtaining a warrant, the officer can enter without
one,182 just as the Court permits warrantless searches for law-enforcement
purposes when it is impracticable to obtain them.'
8 3
Requiring administrative warrants for nonemergency community-
caretaking searches as a matter of Fourth Amendment doctrine carries
substantial disadvantages, however. It would be a substantial shift from the
Supreme Court's practice in the community-caretaking area, which has shown
no inclination whatever to require any kind of warrant,' 84 and it would be
contrary to the trend of the Court's other Fourth Amendment cases, which have
tended of late to stress the Reasonableness Clause much more than the Warrant
Clause.185 Further, if the officer does not subjectively expect to find evidence
of a crime, then the judgment of the neutral magistrate is less necessary to
temper the officer's enthusiasm for searching than when a law-enforcement
warrant is sought. There is no "competitive enterprise of ferreting out" people
who need help.
186
Additionally, community-caretaking situations arise on the spur of the
moment, and it is difficult to imagine officers being able to expend the time
necessary to obtain a warrant while their crime-detection and crime-prevention
duties go neglected. Rather, because community-caretaking needs present
themselves without forewarning, a court is likely to conclude that "as a practical
matter [such searches] could not be[] subjected to the warrant procedure."'187 A
warrant requirement, therefore, might not only decrease police discretion in
181. Johnson v. United States, 330 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
182. See id. at 539-40 ("[W]arrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused
unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing
immediate entry.").
183. See infra notes 188-201 and accompanying text (discussing settings that present a
special need that justifies searches that would have been unconstitutional if conducted
elsewhere).
184. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,446 (1987) ("[Tlhe intrusion into the
trunk of the 1967 Thunderbird at the garage was not unreasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments solely because a warrant had not been obtained by Officer
Weiss after he left the hospital.").
185. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 51 (2000) ("The
reasonableness of highway checkpoints, at issue here, turns on whether they effectively serve a
significant state interest with minimal intrusion on motorists."); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 829 (2002) ("[W]e generally determine the reasonableness of a search by balancing the
nature of the intrusion on the individual's privacy against the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.").
186. Johnson, 330 U.S. at 14.
187. Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20(1968).
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community caretaking, but might dissuade police from engaging in community-
caretaking functions entirely, even in those instances where society would be
benefited by police action.
Less drastically than imposing a requirement of community-caretaking
warrants, we might follow the lead of the Court's "special-needs"'188 precedents
involving roadblocks 189 and inventory searches,' 90 and limit police discretion by
requiring that assistance searches follow established procedures. Because
special-needs cases involve non-law-enforcement purposes such as protecting
potential victims, they are examples of community caretaking. Nevertheless,
special-needs searches are distinguishable from assistance searches in that the
officers serve those non-law-enforcement purposes by enforcing the law. And
though inventory searches are ostensibly undertaken for non-law-enforcement
purposes, they differ from assistance searches both as to the scope and as to the
justification for the doctrine. Inventory searches are permitted only as to items
and persons taken into police custody, and the searches serve the interests in
"protect[ing] the police from potential danger" and from "claims or disputes
over lost or stolen property." 1
91
Thus in special-needs cases it is typically the context of the search, and not
its object, that earns it the appellation. 192 For example, in Vernonia School
188. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 75 n.7 (2000); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J. concurring).
189. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 ("[W]e decline to approve a program whose primary
purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control."); Mich. Dep't
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990) ("Here, checkpoints are selected pursuant to
the guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop every approaching vehicle. The intrusion
resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes
indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerte."); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) ("[C]heckpoint operations both appear to and
actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which
established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists,
that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest.").
190. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) ("Inventory searches are
conducted in accordance with established police department rules or policy and occur whenever
an automobile is seized.").
191. Id. at 369. Inventory searches' other justification, "the protection of the owner's
property," id., bears a resemblance to the interests served by assistance searches, but the context
of inventory searches indicates that the governmental interest in the two situations is quite
different. Because the police have control of property that is inventoried, they have a special
responsibility to ensure its security. Indeed, the interest recognized in Opperman was not the
protection of property simpliciter, but "the protection of the owner's property which remains in
police custody." Id. (emphasis added).
192. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) ("When... 'special needs'-
concerns other than crime detection-are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment
intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing
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District 47J v. Acton, 193 Board of Education v. Earls,194 and New Jersey v.
T.L.O.,' 95 the Court held that the scholastic environment provided a special
need justifying searches that would have been unconstitutional if conducted
elsewhere. Similarly, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Association,1 96
the Court found a special need to drug-test railway employees who had been
involved in accidents or violated safety rules, in part because the time spent
gaining reasonable suspicion or probable cause "likely would result in the loss
or deterioration of the evidence" of drug use. 197 To be sure, the safety of
passengers-the protection of the community-was an interest protected by the
drug testing. 98 But there can be no gainsaying that safety was to be protected
through law enforcement.
The same interests were present in Mac Wade v. Kelly,199 a Second Circuit
case upholding suspicionless searches of New York City subway passengers.
Potential threats to the safety of other passengers presented a "special need" to
search, but the searches were designed to uncover and prevent criminal activity,
and the safety threat was anything but unrelated to the potential crimes.200 If
private and public interests advanced by the parties.").
193. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665-66 (1995) (finding that a
random urinalysis in the context of interscholastic sports did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because of the "decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and
the severity of the need met by the search").
194. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002) (finding that a high school's
suspicionless urinalysis drug testing policy for all those who participated in competitive
extracurricular activities did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the special need for
students' safety extended to athletes and non-athletes alike).
195. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,347-48 (1985) (finding that the standard for
searches in the school context is reasonableness rather than probable cause, and it was
reasonable for a principal to search a student's purse for cigarettes, and it was also reasonable
for him to search for marijuana after he found rolling papers in the purse).
196. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (concluding
that railway employees who previously exhibited unsafe behavior could be subject to drug tests
without a warrant or reasonable suspicion because of the limited discretion of the employees
conducting the tests, the safety interest being protected, and the decreased expectation of
privacy).
197. Id. at 631.
198. See id. at 621 ("[The] governmental interest in ensuring the safety of the traveling
public and of the employees themselves plainly justifies prohibiting covered employees from
using alcohol or drugs on duty, or while subject to being called for duty.").
199. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Program is
reasonable, and therefore constitutional, because (1) preventing a terrorist attack on the subway
is a special need; (2) that need is weighty; (3) the Program is a reasonably effective deterrent;
and (4) ... the searches intrude on a full privacy interest.., to a minimal degree.").
200. See generally Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway and
the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719 (2007).
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potential threats to crime victims sufficed to bring a search within the
community-caretaking doctrine, then police could search anyone suspected of
attempting a violent crime, subject only to a reasonableness test rather than the
usual probable-cause-plus-warrant standard.2°'
In special-needs searches, context makes it impractical to obtain a
warrant--either because delay in obtaining the warrant is intolerable or because
the costs of requiring individualized suspicion are deemed unacceptable.
Community-caretaking cases that do not present law-enforcement concerns,
however, present situations where an individualized-suspicion requirement is
not only impractical, but would not make sense. When police act to attend to
someone who is sick or injured, there is no suspicion of crime, let alone the
quantum of suspicion that would satisfy the constitutional requirements
applicable in the law-enforcement context.
Because uncontrolled police discretion can result in a subversion of Fourth
Amendment protection in both special-needs and assistance searches, it is
helpful to consider how the special-needs doctrine limits the risk that officers
will abuse their discretion. South Dakota v. Opperman,20 2 which established
the constitutionality of inventory searches of impounded cars,20 3 repeatedly




which limited the discretion of the officers who searched. 20 5 As the Court said,
201. See generally, e.g., Robert C. Power, Changing Expectations of Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment, 16 WIDENER L.J. 43 (2006) (analyzing the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness test in the post-September 11 context).
202. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,384 (finding that the inventory search
of a vehicle that was impounded for multiple violations was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because it was done pursuant to routine procedures).
203. See id. at 376 ("On this record we conclude that in following standard police
procedures, prevailing throughout the country and approved by the overwhelming majority of
courts, the conduct of the police was not 'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment."); see
also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 nn. 1-2 (1973) (upholding routine searches
incident to arrest, and leaving for another day the question of the constitutionality of such
searches conducted on pretext).
204. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 366, 372, 375, 376.
205. Some lower courts read Opperman not to require standardized procedures for
inventory searches, but to establish a safe harbor for inventory searches conducted pursuant to
standardized procedures. See United States v. Smith, 522 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[A]
decision to impound a vehicle contrary to a standardized procedure or even in the absence of a
standardized procedure should not be a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment."); United
States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 240-41 (1st Cir. 2006) (upholding a decision to impound a
vehicle though the officer did not follow a standard procedure in ordering the impoundment).
Others disagree. See United States v. Maple, 348 F.3d 260, 264-65 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("Because
the officer's opening of the console does not fall within one of the 'few specifically established
and well[]delineated exceptions' to the warrant requirement... the reasonableness of the
officer's conduct is to be determined by reference to whether he followed the [Metropolitan
1524
POLICE PATERNALISM
such procedures "tend[] to ensure that the intrusion would be limited in scope
to the extent necessary to carry out the caretaking function. 20 6 Likewise,
roadblocks must also conform to standards limiting discretion if they are to be
held reasonable. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz20 7 upheld the use
of sobriety checkpoints, but only under conditions that left little doubt that the
individuals targeted for investigation were chosen neither out of spite nor
because the police suspected, but did not have reasonable suspicion to believe,
they were violating the law.208
Border searches do accord customs agents wide discretion owing to the
"long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself,",209 but even that
,,210 2fncioexception applies only "at the border '  or its "functional equivalents. '2 ,
Interior border patrols must either be supported by reasonable suspicion212 or, if
they take the form of fixed checkpoints, fulfill the standards for other
roadblocks, including limits on officers' discretion.21 3 As the Court noted in
approving fixed border checkpoints, officers' discretion is constrained both in
the operation of the checkpoint and in the selection of the site where it
occurs.214  "[S]ince field officers may stop only those cars passing the
Police Department's] procedures." (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)));
Young v. State, 497 So. 2d 228, 230-31 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1986) ("[T]he police officer
entered appellant's vehicle to secure the vehicle and appellant's belongings inside the vehicle.
This activity constituted a legitimate caretaking function which 'was no more than a routine and
good faith attempt, in the exercise of reasonable caution, to safeguard the defendant's own
property."' (quoting Cobb v. State, 378 So. 2d 82, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979))); Kirk v. State,
832 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992) ("The opening of closed containers in an inventory
search is permissible only if officers are following standard police procedures.").
206. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375.
207. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 445 (1990) (finding that a
highway sobriety checkpoint comports with the Fourth Amendment because it furthers the
legitimate state interest in preventing drunk driving and only minimally intrudes upon individual
motorists).
208. See id. at 453 ("Here, checkpoints are selected pursuant to the guidelines, and
uniformed police officers stop every approaching vehicle.").
209. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
210. Id.
211. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
212. See id. ("The Fourth Amendment forbids... stopping or detaining persons for
questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be
aliens.").
213. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) ("[C]heckpoint
operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity [than do
roving border patrols].").
214. See id. (noting that field officers operate the checkpoints in a regularized manner and
that the officials who select the checkpoints are unlikely to place them in an arbitrary or
oppressive location).
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checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than
there was in the case of roving-patrol stops.,
215
The limits on the conditions under which suspicionless roadblocks and
inventory searches can be conducted suggest that similar constraints might be
appropriate in other types of community caretaking. For the community-
caretaking events that occur with some frequency-for example, the call to
check on an elderly relative whom the family has been unable to reach-
standard procedures could be instituted that would discourage police from
pursuing such requests with more vigor when they believe evidence of a crime
may be obtained by conducting the search. For example, police could require
that a request to enter an individual's residence come from an immediate family
member; that a lieutenant approve in advance any patrol officer's plan to enter
a home to check on a resident; or that the family be unable to contact the
individual for a specific period of time before entry would be authorized.216
Cases applying the Fourth Amendment in community-caretaking
situations, however, generally decline to impose any ex ante requirements on
the police.217 Rather than attempt to tell officers ahead of time how to behave
in community-caretaking situations, courts evaluate the police conduct ex post
at a suppression hearing or in a § 1983 suit.218 The reason may be that there
215. Id.
216. Any waiting period suggests the possibility that an individual would suffer without aid
for a time during which assistance could prove valuable. While such a result is unfortunate, as a
practical matter, one's fear of an individual's incapacity takes shape only after an inordinate
period of unresponsiveness. We certainly would not want to authorize an entry into a person's
dwelling because the person had failed to answer his phone, only to find that the person had not
responded because he was in the shower. Thus, there will always be some risk of squandering
time that could be put to good use, and the amount of time allowed to pass will depend on the
chosen balance between the privacy interest and the risk of harm from inaction.
217. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) ("The Fourth Amendment
permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the
searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the
area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene."); United
States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that it was reasonable for an
officer to enter the defendant's apartment without a warrant to offer assistance because the door
was ajar, the television was on, and nobody answered when he called out on multiple
occasions); State v. Jones, 947 P.2d 1030, 1038 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (permitting a police
officer to exercise discretion in deciding to enter the dwelling of a man in response to the
worries of that man's parents).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (providing a damages remedy for the
victims of unconstitutional actions taken under color of state law); see Lockhart-Bembery v.
Sauro, 498 F.3d 69,76-77 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that it was reasonable for an officer to aska
woman to move her stalled vehicle from the side of the road in the interest of public safety and
that this request did not constitute a seizure for the purposes of a § 1983 suit); Martin v. City of
Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[TIhe officers reasonably believed that
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will always be new situations that do not fit exactly within prior experience,
and thus an attempt to impose ex ante requirements will unduly constrain the
officer's ability to respond appropriately to unanticipated situations. As Chief
Justice Burger stated:
The policeman on the beat, or in the patrol car, makes more decisions and
exercises broader discretion affecting the daily lives of people, every day
and to a greater extent, in many respects, than a judge will ordinarily
exercise in a week.., and no law book, no lawyer, no judge, can really tell
the policeman on the beat how to exercise this discretion perfectly in every
one of the thousands of different situations that can arise in the hour to hour
work of the policeman.
219
Concrete standards limiting officer discretion have the disadvantage that
whatever standards are chosen will be ill-suited to certain individual cases. For
example, as to the suggestion that established "waiting periods" be observed
before entering a dwelling, different amounts of time will be appropriate in
different circumstances.220 If I call my grandfather every day at noon and 7:00
sharp, perhaps police should be able to check on my grandfather if I have been
unable to reach him by 8:00. If, however, I call him every few weeks, then the
passage of a few days might not be enough to lead to the inference that his
health is at risk. Perhaps such problems are remediable by a carefully crafted
standard that authorizes entries only after such time passes as would cause a
reasonable person to fear for the individual's safety, but the more such a
standard attempts to take account of individual circumstances, the less it
eliminates police discretion. A rigid requirement that the police adopt protocols
for dealing with community-caretaking situations, then, might be beneficial in
some recurring situations, but would be a poor fit for many of the events police
officers must encounter.
someone inside Martin's home was potentially in need of help, and they were motivated by a
desire to assist that person rather than gather evidence. The officers' reasonable belief...
justified their visit and subsequent entry.").
219. ABADINSKY, supra note 3, at 15 (quoting J. PuIL CARLTON, A CRIME AGENDA FOR
NORTH CAROLINA 26-27 (1978)).
220. See, e.g., Quezada, 448 F.3d at 1008 ("When Deputy Ruth yelled into the apartment
several times but received no answer, a reasonable officer in the deputy's position could
conclude that someone was inside but was unable to respond for some reason."); Jones, 947
P.2d at 1038 (upholding a search for an individual when his parents "had not seen or heard from
[him] in 3 days, he had inexplicably missed a dinner appointment with them, and he had failed
to answer his phone or return their messages").
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2. Subjective Police Purpose
The Supreme Court has held that the purposes motivating individual
officers are irrelevant in determining the reasonableness of law enforcement,
emergency, and special-needs searches. 221 The "programmatic purpose" of a
special-needs search (as distinguished from the purpose of the officers
conducting the search) does, however, factor into constitutional
reasonableness.222 This subsection analyzes whether purpose should be
considered at all in determining the constitutionality of assistance searches, and
if so, whether it is proper to consider the subjective purpose of officers or to
only consider programmatic purpose.
The Supreme Court has been hesitant in most instances to consider the
subjective motivation of police officers, but the cases rejecting a subjective
standard arose either in situations where the police possessed probable cause or
in emergency situations where there could be little debate about the need for the
officers to act.223  Consideration of officers' subjective purposes in
nonemergency community-caretaking situations could help achieve the same
discretion-limiting function served by the probable-cause requirement for
criminal investigations and by the pressures for action that surround
emergencies.
For that reason, the Fourth Amendment should require assistance searches
actually to be motivated by a desire to help the public. Special-needs and
emergency cases allow the police to take "reasonable" action in the absence of
probable cause and without inquiring into the subjective motivations of
officers, but they constrain the discretion of police through other means. 224 As
we have seen, however, those means are ill-adapted to assistance searches.
225
Allowing assistance searches only when the officer in question is actually,
subjectively motivated by the desire to assist the public would serve that
discretion-limiting function without stripping the officer of the flexibility to
adapt to the needs of any given situation.
221. See supra Part IV.A. 1 (providing examples of Supreme Court cases that establish an
objective standard of reasonableness in community-caretaking settings other than assistance
searches).
222. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 532 U.S. 32, 45 (2000).
223. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (referring to Supreme Court cases that
emphatically state that subjective intentions do not factor into Fourth Amendment analysis).
224. See, e.g., supra notes 172-80 and accompanying text (stating that in these contexts, an
officer's discretion is limited by standard procedures).
225. See supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text (explaining that in the context of
assistance searches, requiring an officer to obtain a warrant or to follow standard procedures
risks ignoring the exigencies and particularities of different situations).
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Specifically, in assessing the reasonableness of assistance searches,
reviewing courts should apply a standard that includes both subjective and
objective elements. Courts should apply the community-caretaking doctrine
only where the officer reasonably believed-i.e., he subjectively held a belief
that was objectively reasonable, as evaluated from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the officer's position-that his assistance was
226appropriate. 6 Because the government is seeking the benefit of an exception
to the warrant requirement,227 it must bear the burden of proof on both
points.
228
The purpose of the community-caretaking doctrine is to encourage
government officials to offer assistance to the public. Extending the doctrine to
cover cases where the police were not in fact motivated by a community-
caretaking purpose would provide little, if any, benefit; the public is unlikely to
226. In the law-enforcement context, courts assess reasonable suspicion and probable cause
based on a "reasonable officer" standard. Such a standard considers the training and experience
of the officer in determining whether there was sufficient indication that "criminal activity may
be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Police experience is important in making such
a determination because an experienced officer would be more likely than a lay person to
recognize certain behavior as indicative of criminal activity. In the community-caretaking
context, however, experience as a police officer is of minimal help, because a lay person can
ordinarily tell as well as a police officer whether a person is ill or otherwise in need of
assistance. The experience of life, rather than the experience of law enforcement, is likely to
help determine whether a community-caretaking search or seizure is called for. See Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (holding that the scope of a consent search is to be
determined by answering: "What would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect?"). Some courts, however, disagree, and apply the
reasonable-officer standard to community caretaking as well as to law enforcement. See, e.g.,
State v. Bakewell, 730 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Neb. 2007) (considering the "totality of the
circumstances surrounding the [traffic] stop, including [the officer's] objective observations and
considerations based upon his training").
227. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (finding that the state failed
to meet its burden of proving that a third party possessed common authority over the premises
and that a warrant was thus not required); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)
("[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it."); McDonald v.
UnitedStates, 335 U.S. 451,456 (1948) ("We cannot... excuse the absence of a search warrant
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative."); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 76, § 6.6(a)
("Since the [emergency] doctrine is an exception to the ordinary Fourth Amendment
requirement of a warrant for entry into a home, the burden of proof is on the state to show that
the warrantless entry fell within the exception." (quoting Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364
(8th Cir. 1971))).
228. The burden of proving the officer's subjective motivation should rest on the
government for an additional reason: The government is the party with primary access to the
information relevant to that determination. An individual forced to try to prove the officer's bad
faith would have little access to the information needed to make out such proof.
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be helped by an officer who is not trying to help.229 A purely objective
approach has the advantage of obviating any need to consider the sometimes-
difficult question of subjective purpose, but at the cost of permitting police to
act when they are not trying to comply with the law indeed, when they believe
that they are violating the law. In those cases the courts can, and should, deter
Fourth Amendment violations; 230 bad-faith conduct should be penalized, not
rewarded, if the privacy and liberty guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are
to be respected.23'
Requiring police to have been motivated by a community-caretaking
concern would limit the broad discretion they would otherwise possess, without
limiting their ability to give us help when we need it. In Murray v. United
States,232 the Court was presented with an analogous situation involving the
independent source doctrine. There, the police had probable cause to obtain a
warrant to search a warehouse but entered the warehouse before they applied
229. See Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
71, 77-78, 87 (2008) (noting the ability of tests that focus on the subjective intentions of police
officers to deter Fourth Amendment violations).
230. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 168 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (referring to
"the deterrence of bad-faith violations of the Fourth Amendment" as "the one area in which [the
exclusionary rule's] use is most certainly justified").
231. For example, in People v. Morton, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), police
received reports about marijuana cultivation at the defendants' nursery. Id. at 389. Arriving on
the scene, the police noticed marijuana leaves near a spot where it appeared that someone had
breached the property's fence to steal the contraband. Id. at 389-90. The officers then entered
the property, ostensibly to determine whether any victims of the apparent theft needed
assistance. Id. at 390-91. While it is certainly conceivable that officers might enter a house to
ensure the safety of burglary victims, and while some of those entries would be reasonable, see,
e.g., People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 934 (Cal. 1999) ("Under the community caretaking
exception, circumstances short of a perceived emergency may justify a warrantless entry,
including the protection of property, as 'where the police reasonably believe that the premises
have recently been or are being burglarized."' (citation omitted)); Love v. State, 659 S.E.2d 835,
837-38 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that "police officers were justified in conducting a search
for possible intruders" because the police "had a reasonable basis for believing that... an
emergency existed"), it is plainly apparent that the officers' subjective purpose in Morton was
law enforcement. See Morton, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 394-95 (finding faulty reasoning in the
officer's conclusion that the search was necessary to protect defendants' life or property because
she had found "evidence of a marijuana rip off' and "drug thefts may involve violence"). The
result in the case was predictable: Police found nobody in need of help, but did find evidence of
crime. See id. at 392 (noting that the officer saw marijuana being processed, but that the officer
did not fear "for the safety of the occupants"). The court held the entry unconstitutional. Id. at
394-95.
232. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 541-44 (1988) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment does not require the suppression of evidence initially discovered during an illegal
search if the same evidence is discovered later in a legal search with a valid warrant untainted by
the initial warrantless search).
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for a warrant. The officers discovered evidence of crime and then applied for.
the warrant, not mentioning any of the observations made during the illegal
entry. The Supreme Court applied the inevitable-discovery doctrine and upheld
the admission of evidence seized during the execution of the warrant, but noted
that the result would have been different "if the agents' decision to seek the
warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry. '233 In
other words, it was insufficient that there was, objectively, probable cause for
the warrant; the subjective motivation of the officers must have been unaffected
by the unconstitutional behavior.234 A contrary rule would give police an
incentive to invade the private areas of persons they suspect of crime. 35
The Court has treated purpose as relevant in assessing the constitutionality
of special-needs "programs" designed to achieve some non-law-enforcement
end. Over the last several years, the Court has validated such programs as
suspicionless drug testing of students engaging in extra-curricular athletics236 or
other activities,237 and roadblocks seeking to discover intoxicated drivers238 or
to seek assistance in locating a hit-and-run driver.239 On the other hand, the
Court has struck down a program under which pregnant women were drug
tested to minimize the harms to unborn children from their mothers' drug-
abuse240 and has struck down a roadblock designed to check for evidence of
illegal drugs.24'
The distinction the Court has attempted to maintain in special-needs cases
is between those activities having the primary purpose of law enforcement and
those whose "primary purpose" is something "special, 242 and "substantial-
important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
233. Id. at 542.
234. Id. at 533-34.
235. Id.
236. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
237. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002).
238. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Stiz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990).
239. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004).
240. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 87 (2001).
241. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
242. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,405 (2006) (holding that police officers did
not violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered a home without a warrant to stop a fight
going on inside); Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83-84 (declaring a hospital's policy of reporting urine
tests to the police unconstitutional because of the policy's predominantly law-enforcement
purpose); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48 (finding a city's drug interdiction checkpoint program
unconstitutional because its purpose was indistinguishable from the city's general interest in
crime control).
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individualized suspicion." 243 Where such a "special need" is the primary
motivation for the search, the warrant requirement plays no role. Further, the
purpose that matters is not the intent of the specific official whose activities are
being analyzed, but rather it is the purpose of the program as a whole that
matters.244 "[W]hat is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the
search 2 45 is "irrelevant.,
246
This focus on programmatic purpose, however, creates obvious
difficulties when there is no program-when the decision to make an entry for
community-caretaking purposes is made on an ad hoc basis in response to an
unanticipated situation. Such a situation presented itself in Brigham City v.
Stuart, where the police entered a home to stop a fight which was then
ongoing. 247 The Court acknowledged that "'an inquiry into programmatic
purpose' is sometimes appropriate" in cases involving "programmatic searches
conducted without individualized suspicion," but in Stuart there was no
"programmatic search[] " and, therefore, the Court made no inquiry into purpose
at all.248 "It therefore does not matter here ... whether the officers entered...
to arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured
and prevent further violence.
2 49
Not considering subjective purpose in assistance searches creates
something of an anomaly: Where an individual officer's discretion is limited
by the terms of a police-department program that he is implementing, the Court
attempts to ensure that the program was not adopted as a pretext to accomplish
243. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
244. See Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404-05 ("An action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the circumstances,
viewed objectively, justify [the] action."' (citations omitted)); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48 ("[T]he
purpose inquiry... is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to
probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene.").
245. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 405.
246. Id. at 404; cf Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10(1996) (holding that the
motivation of officers stopping a vehicle for a traffic violation is irrelevant so long as the
officers had probable cause to believe an offense was committed).
247. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 405. In explaining the situation before the entry, the Court
described the fight, noting that:
[Flour adults were attempting, with some difficulty, to restrain a juvenile. The
juvenile eventually "broke free, swung a fist and struck one of the adults in the
face.... ." The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up
against a refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the
floor.
Id. at 401 (citations omitted).




law-enforcement ends.250 Where, however, the officer is not confined to the
parameters of a department program, and thus has considerable discretion to
choose the places he searches, pretext is irrelevant and the search is governed
only by a general assessment of objective reasonableness. 251 Accordingly,
courts appear to scrutinize police action least strictly where the risk of
arbitrariness is the greatest.
This anomaly is tolerable under the facts of Stuart-or of any other case in
which police are presented with an emergency-because the emergency
demands an immediate police response and thereby itself effectively constrains
the actions of police. There is little practical discretion in emergency situations,
such as the one in Stuart, because society does not want or expect a police
officer to stand by and allow a condition or altercation to continue where it
presents a substantial risk of serious harm.252 For those reasons, courts have
concluded that warrantless searches are constitutional if they are otherwise-
reasonable responses to emergency situations involving immediate threats to
persons or property.253
In nonemergency situations, such as checking on businesses whose doors
are unlocked at night or investigating a disabled vehicle, police are presented
with considerable discretion concerning which actions, if any, are appropriate
responses to the facts presented.254 These cases are the ones where police
250. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79-86 (2000) (stating that "the
'special need' ... advanced as a justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized
suspicion [must be] divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement"); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-48 (2000) ("Because the primary purpose of the
Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment.").
251. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,394-95 (1978) ("For this reason, warrants are
generally required to search a person's home or his person unless 'the exigencies of the
situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 456 (1948))).
252. See Jack E. Call, Defining the Community Caretaking Function, 21 POLICING: INT'L J.
POLICE STRAT. & MGMT 269, 271 (1998) ("The public undoubtedly views the police as more
than mere enforcers of the law... and would be critical of the police if they failed to assist
those in need of help or failed to prevent harm to people or property.").
253. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405-06 (2006) (holding a group of
officers' entry into a home "plainly reasonable under the circumstances" because the officers
could hear "an altercation occurring" inside); United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673, 678 (4th Cir.
1992) (stating that under the emergency situation doctrine courts, may "excuse objectively
reasonable mistakes [made] by an officer in determining that an emergency warranting
immediate entry and appropriately limited search existed").
254. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,454 (1948) ("Where... officers are
not responding to an emergency, there must be compelling reasons to justify the absence of a
search warrant.").
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discretion most presents a risk of abuse, and where the direction that searches
must be reasonable provides the least guidance.
Not only does policy argue for requiring a good-faith community-
caretaking motivation on the part of the searching officials, and not only does
precedent permit such a result, but each potential alternative is objectionable.
One alternative to a good-faith requirement is to permit community-caretaking
searches whenever the officer might reasonably have believed that such a
search or seizure would further a community-caretaking function.255 Such a
rule would effectively permit officers to conduct searches and seizures at will,
as an officer's assistance could always be useful, even with such everyday tasks
as ensuring the safety of children playing in the yard, quelling a dispute with
neighbors, making sure someone cleaning gutters is on a steady ladder, or
checking on the health of a person who called-in sick to work. As a result, such
a standard would undermine the probable cause and warrant requirements
applicable to law-enforcement searches.
Stuart, though it allowed the police to act proactively to prevent injuries,
did not permit nearly as much police intrusion into individuals' daily lives.
That case involved, in the Court's words, "persons who [were] seriously injured
or threatened with such injury."256 There is no need to worry about controlling
police discretion in such instances; serious injuries are rare and demand
immediate police responses in a way different from the minor inconveniences
that present the greatest opportunity for pretextual searches and seizures.
Another potential objective alternative is to permit community-caretaking
searches and seizures whenever the average officer observing the situation
would have acted for a community-caretaking purpose. Whren rejected a
comparable standard in the law-enforcement context, however, and there is no
reason why such a standard would be more appropriate for community
caretaking. In Whren, the Court considered and found inadequate a standard
that would have asked whether a typical officer would have enforced the traffic
violation at issue.257 The Court concluded that it would be more difficult to
discern the behavior of a typical, but hypothetical, officer than to determine the
motivations of the individual officer at issue.258 The motion court would need
255. See Stuart, 547 U.S. at 406 ("[T]he officers had an objectively reasonable basis for
believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was
just beginning." (emphasis added)).
256. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
257. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,813-16 (1996) ("Instead of asking whether
the individual officer had the proper state of mind, the petitioners would have us ask, in effect,
whether (based on general police practices) it is plausible to believe that the officer had the
proper state of mind.").
258. See id. at 814-15 ("[I]t seems to us somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an
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to hear testimony about the practices of the entire department (or whatever the
relevant community would be) "to plumb the collective consciousness of law
enforcement" 259-an impracticable task, to say the least. Similarly, determining
whether a typical officer would have felt the need to act in a community-
caretaking capacity is all but impossible.
More fundamentally, as Whren recognized, considering the "hypothetical
reaction of a hypothetical constable" is really a backdoor way of assessing
260whether the officer conducting a particular search had an ulterior motive. It
is "more sensible, 2 61 therefore, to consider an individual's subjective
"reasonable belief' than to "frame a[n objective] test designed to combat
pretext in such fashion that the court cannot take into account actual and
admitted pretext."
262
When other areas of the law have faced similar threats to privacy interests
from ostensibly helpful actors, the law has required subjective good faith and
has generally required objective reasonableness as well. Under the "necessity"
or "choice-of-evils" defense as defined by the Model Penal Code, a person is
not guilty of an offense if his or her conduct was "necessary to avoid a harm or
evil to himself or to another.., provided that: the harm or evil sought to be
avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense charged., 263 Because the defense depends on the harm
sought to be avoided by the actor's conduct, actors are entitled to the defense if
they make a reasonable mistake and commit a crime that was not actually
necessary to prevent a greater harm.2 4 If the law permits civilians to violate
individual officer than to plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to
determine whether a 'reasonable officer' would have been moved to act. . .
259. Id. at 815.
260. See id. at 814-15 ("[Tihis approach is plainly and indisputably driven by subjective
considerations.").
261. Id. at 814.
262. Id.
263. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(l)(a) (1985).
264. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 184(e)(1) (1984) ("[I]f a police
officer shoots a bank robber, whom he reasonably believes is about to shoot a teller but who in
fact has an unloaded gun, he has intentionally killed the robber. But if the circumstances were as
he thought, his conduct would be justified."). If the actor errs in balancing the interests,
however (i.e., he or she believes, contrary to the opinion of the community, that the harm his
conduct causes is less than the harm averted), then the defense does not apply. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 2 (1985) (stating that for a defendant to use the defense "the harm or
evil sought to be avoided must be greater than that which would be caused by the commission of
the offense, not that the defendant believe it to be so"); MARKuS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAw:
MODEL PENAL CODE 201 (2002) (stating that "a mistaken belief in the.., choice of evils will"
preclude the defense); ROBINSON, supra § 124(d)(1) ("The balancing of evils cannot, of course,
be committed merely to the private judgment of the act."). As applied to the community-
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trespass laws where they reasonably believe a violation is necessary to prevent a
greater harm, individuals can hardly claim that their privacy rights have been
infringed when an officer has done the same; the Court has consistently held
that the Fourth Amendment places no greater restrictions on police than the law
places on others.265
Likewise, the criminal law privileges actions taken in defense of others,
and most jurisdictions extend the privilege to an actor who reasonably, but
incorrectly, believes that the person on whose behalf she acts needs
assistance.266 Such an approach has a basis in the retributive function of
criminal law, under which punishment is inappropriate for someone who acts
reasonably (i.e., nonnegligently), but it also accords with the Court's focus on
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. The Constitution's proscription
of unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has said, permits the
caretaking doctrine, an entry is constitutional if the officer mistakenly-but reasonably-
believes that the entry is necessary to avert a greater harm. An officer's mistake as to the
relative importance of the infringed privacy interest as against the harm sought to be avoided by
the entry might also qualify as a reasonable search despite the inapplicability of the necessity
defense, if the officer's mistaken weighing of the interests was reasonable. The Court has, in
other contexts, concluded that police may "reasonably" make "unreasonable" searches. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (declining to suppress evidence from a search
conducted on less than probable cause where the officers reasonably relied on a magistrate's
decision to issue a search warrant); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 182-89 (1990)
(upholding the search of an apartment pursuant to the consent of someone unauthorized to grant
it).
265. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (stating that what "a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection"); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (same); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,213 (1986) (same); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984)
(stating that the "expectation of privacy in open fields is not an exception that society recognizes
as reasonable"); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (stating that an individual
does not have an "expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation" of his automobile
arriving on his private property "after leaving a public highway"); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 743-44 (1979) (stating that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy for the
numbers dialed on his telephone because he voluntarily conveys those numbers to the telephone
company). The Court has been more solicitous of privacy rights regarding searches of the
subject's home. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (stating that the expectation
of privacy in the home has "roots deep in the common law" tradition and is where "the minimal
expectation of privacy" exists); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984)
("Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view would
present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of
Fourth Amendment oversight."). Even police surveillance of the interior of the home, however,
might be permissible to the extent that the surveillance technology is "in general public use."
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
266. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (1985) ("[T]he use of force upon or toward the person
of another is justifiable to protect a third person when... the actor believes that his intervention
is necessary for the protection of such other person.").
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government to take reasonable actions that in retrospect appears unnecessary or
unwise. 26 7 In the community-caretaking context, reasonableness suggests that
police may enter citizens' private areas if the officer reasonably believes
assistance is necessary, even if it turns out to be only a false alarm.268
The analogy to the defense-of-others justification suggests, however, that
if a search is to be justified as falling within the community-caretaking doctrine,
the officers in question must actually believe they are acting in a community-
caretaking capacity. As one court phrased the issue in a closely related context:
One of the determining elements in self-defense is the belief of the accused,
concerning the imminence of danger. While it is necessary, therefore, that
he have reasonable grounds to believe, it is necessary, also, that his mind
react to those grounds, to the extent of believing both that danger is
imminent, and that force must be used to repel it.
269
267. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1995) (holding constitutional the
seizure of an individual whom police reasonably, but incorrectly, believed had an outstanding
arrest warrant); cf, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,246 (1983) ("[P]robable cause does not
demand the certainty we associate with formal trials."); id. at 235 ("[T]he 'quanta... of proof
appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant."
(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949))).
268. Accordingly, it should be irrelevant whether a reasonable but mistaken belief as to the
need for self-defense or defense of others is termed a justification or an excuse. Compare
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 761-68 (1978) (arguing that if the defense of
the attacked person is a "right" action then everyone is entitled to do it), and George P. Fletcher,
Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a Justification or an Excuse for an Escape?, 26
UCLA L. REv. 1355, 1362-63 (1979) ("If reasonable beliefs could generate justification for
harming another person, then we might indeed have the case of both parties to the fray acting
justifiably."), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985) ("[T]he use of force upon or toward
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for
the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person...."),
Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law, 32
UCLA L. REv. 61, 92-95 (1984) ("[E]ven ifjustification implies right conduct, I believe a lack
of justifying conditions need not necessarily render conduct unjustifiable."), and Kent
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1897,
1907-11 (1984) ("My view about this stands in opposition to suggestions by those who propose
rigorous distinctions between justification and excuse that acts that would be wrong if all the
true facts had been known are never justified, only excused."). In either case, the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated, because where the police made a
reasonable mistake, the conduct was by definition not "unreasonable."
269. Josey v. United States, 135 F.2d 809, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (emphasis added); see also
Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 509 (1898) (noting the defendant's "evil intent" in
denying him a defense of self-defense, and saying that "[t]here can be no pretense that he was
acting under a reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm at
the hands of the [deceased]"); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 136, at 149 ("[W]hether a reasonable belief
is required or not, the defendant must actually believe in the necessity for force. He has no
defense when he intentionally kills his enemy in complete ignorance of the fact that his enemy,
when killed, was about to launch a deadly attack upon him.").
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The Model Penal Code's commentaries concerning self-defense confirm
that "the actor must believe in the necessity of his defensive action... and thus
cannot be privileged by accident., 270 One is not justified in killing another
"because it subsequently appears that there was actual danger, of which he was
at the time ignorant.
'" 271
Tort law's privilege for actions done to assist others272 is perhaps even
more analogous to community caretaking than are criminal law's justifications
for necessity and defense of others because tort law is concerned with
compensation rather than punishment. The tort-law privilege, therefore,
suggests that individuals have no right to be free from such intrusions, not
merely that the intruders should not be punished. Moreover, because the
legality of searches and seizures under the common law was tested in trespass
suits, 273 tort law is likely to be an especially valuable source concerning the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement.
The modem privilege is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which provides that individuals may enter the private property of another if it
"reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to" persons or
property, "unless the actor knows or has reason to know that the one for whose
benefit he enters is unwilling that he shall take such action., 274 Accordingly,
the tort privilege incorporates a requirement of reasonableness in the action of
the one entering ("reasonably appears necessary") and a subjective focus on the
person to be helped ("the one for whose benefit [the actor] enters is
unwilling"). 275 As I argue below, 2 76 this attention to the desires of the person to
270. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 2(b) (1985).
271. Trogdon v. State, 32 N.E. 725, 727 (Ind. 1892); see also DUBBER, supra note 264, at
206 ("[C]onduct that only turns out later to have met the conditions for self-defense.., won't
qualify as self-defense.").
272. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 76 cmt. c (1965) ("Under the rule stated in
this Section, the actor is privileged to protect a third person by means which he correctly or
reasonably believes the third person is privileged to use in his own defense although such third
person is not in fact privileged to use such means.").
273. See, e.g., BRADFORD P. WILsON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A
JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY 16 (Harold Hyman & Stuart Bruchey eds., 1986) ("[U]nreasonable
searches and seizures were considered trespasses, and ... officers of the government who
abused their authority in such a manner were liable to those whose persons or property they
caused to be invaded.").
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197(1) (1965).
275. Id.
276. See infra Part IV.C ("[R]easonableness in a case where government is acting to help
an individual by subjecting him or her to a search or seizure should depend on whether the
searching officials have appropriately represented the interests and desires of the subject.").
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be helped should be part of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement when searches are undertaken for the benefit of the party searched.
Tort law's privilege for actions in defense of persons or property is
valuable here not only for what it says about the reasonableness requirement
but also for its attention to the actor's state of mind. Through the language
"knows or has reason to know,, 2 77 the tort privilege requires both that the actor
subjectively believe that the help is desired, and that the subjective belief be
objectively reasonable. Because most people would want to be helped, the tort
privilege278 and this Article's proposed rule allow actors to presume that help is
desired absent an indication to the contrary. If there are such indications,
however, police should not be able to override them while claiming to act for
the benefit of someone who declines assistance.
There are administrative costs in determining an officer's subjective
motivation, 279 and in part for those reasons the Court held in United States v.
Leon 280 that the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule turns on the
objective reasonableness of the police action, rather than on the subjective good
faith of the officer. 28 1 Accordingly, "Leon, by foreclosing inquiry directly into
the officer's state of mind, creates the possibility of nonsuppression
notwithstanding even a deliberate constitutional violation.
2 82
Nevertheless, Leon's context suggests limits to its purely objective focus.
First, the Court's adoption of a purely objective standard was dictum. The
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197(1) (1965).
278. The tort privilege establishes a default rule permitting actors to enter if nothing is
known about the desires of the person to be helped. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 197(1) (1965) ("One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession of another if
it... reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to... a third person."). The
privilege, according to the terms, of the Restatement, applies "unless the actor knows or has
reason to know that the one for whose benefit he enters is unwilling that he shall take such
action," id. (emphasis added), rather than if the one for whose benefit the actor enters manifests
a desire that he shall take such action.
279. Such an inquiry is possible to undertake, however. See United States v. McGough,
412 F.3d 1232, 1239 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (noting that the magistrate judge concluded that the
officers were partially motivated by obtaining evidence "relating to the violation of a criminal
statute" but concluding that the test was an objective one and holding that the search was not
objectively reasonable).
280. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,905 (1984) (holding that evidence does not
have to be suppressed if the officers whom conducted the search reasonably relied on a
magistrate judge's decision to issue a search warrant).
281. See id. at 919 n.20, 922 n.23 (stating that the good faith inquiry is an objective
question of whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known the search was illegal
despite a magistrate's authorization of a warrant).
282. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 76, § 1.3(e).
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lower court had found that the officers had subjective good faith,283 and the
Supreme Court did not disturb this finding. Thus, it is uncertain that the Court
would apply the purely objective standard in a case where the officer's
subjective bad faith was demonstrated, though of course Leon's focus on
objective reasonableness may cause bad faith to go undetected.
Second, and more important, Leon applied the good-faith exception to a
search conducted pursuant to a warrant,284 albeit one later held not to have been
supported by probable cause. 28 5 Because a magistrate determined that there
was probable cause, and because the officers' behavior was objectively
reasonable, little deterrent purpose would be served by requiring subjective
good faith.286 In a situation as presented in Leon, the objective standard allows
the police reasonably to defer to the judgment of the magistrate issuing the
warrant.287 Where the police are making their own determination whether to
proceed without a warrant, however, the good-faith exception may be entirely
inapplicable. 88
Even if the good-faith exception extends to warrantless searches, it is still
another step to conclude that in such warrantless searches the police officers'
subjective motivation will be treated as irrelevant. Leon declined to inquire
into subjective motivation, but did so in a situation where there were other
constraints on arbitrary police conduct, including the magistrate's decision to
issue the warrant. 289  Extending Leon's purely objective focus to the
community-caretaking context, however, would remove all effective constraint
on arbitrary behavior.
283. Leon, 468 U.S. at 904.
284. See id. at 902 ("A facially valid search warrant was issued .... The ensuing searches
produced large quantities of drugs.... ").
285. See id. at 903 ("[The District Court] concluded that the affidavit was insufficient to
establish probable cause .... ").
286. See id. at 920-21 (recognizing that no deterrent purpose could be served by excluding
evidence where "an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a
judge or magistrate and acted within its scope").
287. See id. ("[A]n officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable cause
determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient.").
288. See I LAFAvE, supra note 76, § 1.4 (discussing the impact the subjective belief of the
police officer should have on the determination of whether or not evidence seized without a
warrant is admissible).
289. See id. § 1.4(e) (arguing that pure objectivity is appropriate "provided there are more
reliable and feasible means of determining in a particular case whether or not the challenged
arrest or search was arbitrary").
1540
POLICE PATERNALISM
B. Third-Party Community Caretaking
The last section considered whether the warrants and established
procedures required in other types of community caretaking should be applied
to assistance searches. It also considered whether the reasonableness of
assistance searches should turn in part on the subjective purposes of the
searching officers. Even if subjective purpose is relevant, though,
reasonableness requires more. Assistance searches must be objectively
reasonable as well. This section and the next analyze the components of this
objective reasonableness determination.
Courts should ask three questions in evaluating the reasonableness of a
community-caretaking search or seizure designed to assist the general public or
a specific person or persons other than the one whose rights are implicated by
the search or seizure. First, how significant is the intrusion? Second, how
serious is the potential harm? And third, what is the likelihood that the
intrusion will prevent or lessen the harm? The questions draw on Brown v.
Texas's 290 three-part test for balancing "the public interest and [an individual's]
right to personal security and privacy" in the context of a suspicionless
seizure,29' which requires "a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. '292
First, how significant is the intrusion?293 Subsidiary questions include the
following: What place was searched? A search of a garage may trigger less
substantial privacy concerns than would a search of a bedroom or a bureau,294
290. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1979) (holding that police acted
unconstitutionally in detaining the defendant and requiring him to identify himself when they
lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was engaged in criminal conduct).
291. Id. at 52.
292. Id. at 50-51.
293. See State v. Mireles, 991 P.2d 878, 881 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) ("The intrusion into
Mireles's privacy was minimal. The balance of interests in this case strikes in favor of the
public interest in motorist assistance.").
294. North Dakota has interpreted the community-caretaking doctrine not to apply at all to
entries of dwellings. See State v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454,460 (N.D. 2008) ("[T]he warrantless
entry of law enforcement officers into a home presents a Fourth Amendment issue and should
not be examined under the community caretaking doctrine."). That state, however, analyzes the
emergency doctrine separately, and does permit entries of dwellings in situations satisfying
Mitchell's emergency test. See State v. Nelson, 691 N.W.2d 218, 224 (N.D. 2005) ("A
warrantless search is not unreasonable if the government can prove the search or seizure is
subject to one of the few well-delineated exceptions. One such exception is the emergency
doctrine." (citations omitted)). Thus, police may enter dwellings for community-caretaking
purposes, but only in emergencies. Essentially, then, North Dakota balances the potential harm
avoided by the intrusion against the harm caused by the conclusion, and concludes that the
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and a search of a car on the highway may concern us even less,29 owing to the
reduced expectation of privacy applicable to automobiles.296 At what time of
day was the search of seizure conducted? Mid-day police activity may intrude
on our privacy and solitude less than would activity performed at night.297 How
much time did the police action take? A brief search or seizure is less of an
intrusion, all other things equal, than is a lengthier one.298
severity of an intrusion into a home can be justified only when there is an "immediate need" to
act to prevent the harm. See id. at 224 (balancing the immediate need for assistance with the
intent of the search and the connection between the emergency and area to be searched).
295. Some have suggested, and some courts have held, that the community-caretaking
doctrine should be limited to situations involving automobiles because of the greater privacy
interests surrounding homes. See United States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356, 1366 n.5 (10th Cir.
2004) ("The Government argues that the 'community caretaking' doctrine allows this detention.
We disagree. Our cases specifically limit this doctrine to vehicle searches." (citing United
States v. Thomson, 354 F.3d 1197, 1200 n.l (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d
531, 535 (10th Cir. 1994))); Jennifer Fink, Note, People v. Ray: The Fourth Amendment and
the Community Caretaking Exception, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 135, 157-58 (2000) ("The officers
should not be able to use the community caretaking exception to circumvent the Fourth
Amendment protection of homes; such exception should only be applied to automobiles based
on their unique, transitory nature." (citations omitted)). Such an approach is unwise, however,
as the Virginia Court of Appeals pointed out: "It would be illogical to allow the police to render
assistance to a convulsing man in a car while denying this same assistance to a man on the
street." Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. Ct. App. 1995). Most courts
extend the community-caretaking doctrine to the home. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 321
F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the officers' entry into and "'protective
sweep"' of a home under the emergency doctrine was lawful (citations omitted)); United States
v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1524 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Quite clearly, nothing in the Fourth
Amendment requires the police (and the neighbors) to idly observe and tolerate a late-night,
ongoing nuisance to the community while a warrant is sought and obtained."). And if the police
can offer assistance to the man on the street or in the home, there is no reason not to apply the
plain view exception, see generally, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), to permit
the introduction of whatever evidence is found during that assistance. See infra Part V
(discussing prophylactic exclusionary rules).
There is a legitimate concern that applying the community-caretaking doctrine to validate
searches of homes and pedestrians would lead to an unacceptable subversion of the probable-
cause requirement, but the concern should be met by limiting police discretion to subvert the
requirement, rather than by permitting unfettered discretion in an arbitrary subset of potential
searches and seizures.
296. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) ("[T]here is a reduced
expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of
police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling.").
297. See State v. Lindner, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (Idaho 1979) ("Historically, there has been a
strong aversion to nighttime searches." (citations omitted)).
298. See McGann v. Ne. I11. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 8 F.3d 1174, 1186 (7th Cir.
1993) ("[T]he government is not required to have an individualized suspicion with respect to
each person searched, so long as the need... was great, the intrusion-measured by the
duration of the search and the intensity of the investigation-was minimal and the discretion of
the official was relatively circumscribed.").
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Second, how significant is the potential harm?299 Might someone be
killed? Injured? How seriously? If property is at risk,300 what is the value301 of
the property? An officer should not be able to seize an individual to assist with
a trivial inconvenience, as when a motorist appears to need directions, 302 though
an officer may of course offer assistance for minor matters as long as there is no
interference significant enough to constitute a seizure.
Third, what is the likelihood that the intrusion will prevent or lessen the
harm? 303 Even significant intrusions of privacy interests will be reasonable if
299. See, e.g., United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1239 (1 th Cir. 2005) ("In this
case, the exigencies of the situation... are not compelling enough to find that the officers'
warrantless entry into McGough's apartment was objectively reasonable.").
300. Most courts apply the community-caretaking exception to situations where the only
threat is to property, though some do not. See Decker, supra note 93, at 508-10 (discussing the
remaining ambiguities in the law when property is the sole interest to be protected). The better
rule is not to exclude such entries from the doctrine entirely (if my house were burning I would
want government assistance even if nobody's life was threatened by the fire), but rather to weigh
the potential loss of property in determining the reasonableness of the police action. See
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (noting that a structural fire "clearly presents an
exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable"').
The protection of mere property provides a justification in criminal law and tort law, as
long as the amount sought to be gained exceeds the expected harm caused by the actor. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(l)(a) (1962) ("(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to
avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil
sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense charged; .... ."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 cmt. c (1965) ("In
determining the question of reasonableness, the probable advantage to the actor to be expected
from the entry must be weighed against the probable detriment to the possessor of the land or
other persons properly upon it.").
301. Value may be monetary or otherwise. A balancing approach also allows courts to take
into account the gradations in importance of various pieces of property. An approach that
excludes "mere property" per se, however, see supra note 300 (discussing the standard for
balancing harm when considering protection of mere property as the justification for criminal or
tortious conduct), would prevent government from acting to protect property, such as a house or
a car, that may be worth much money, and property, such as a pet, whose value is less calculable
but potentially no less significant. See Yates v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 9928(SHS),
2006 WL 2239430, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006) (upholding a community-caretaking entry to
protect animals); People v. Rogers, 708 N.Y.S.2d 795, 796 (N.Y. App. Term 2000) (same);
State v. Bauer, 379 N.W.2d 895, 899 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (same). Certainly many individuals
value their houses, cars, jewelry, furniture, photos, and pets more than the privacy interest they
have against an officer checking on their well being.
302. See Poe v. Commonwealth, 169 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) ("Officer
Marszalek's belief that Poe may need directions is not a valid basis to stop him in these
circumstances.... The community caretaking function does not provide justification for the
stop in this case.").
303. See State v. Atkins, 834 N.E.2d 1028, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("An individual's
rights to liberty, privacy and free movement.., are not absolute; they must be balanced against
society's right to protect itself.").
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they are virtually certain to avoid substantial harms. However, if the
interference with privacy has a negligible chance of producing any beneficial
effect, then the search may be unreasonable even if the potential harm is quite
significant. To take an extreme example, if a serial killer kidnaps a person in
New York's Central Park, the potential harm is of the utmost significance.
Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable for the authorities to break down every
door in Manhattan, because each such entry has an infinitesimally small chance
of saving the victim. Additionally, if the officer's only indication that help is
needed is unreliable, then there is less of a chance that the officer's intrusion
will accomplish anything beneficial. 304 Reliable information, such as the
officer's own observations, would provide more indication that the officer's
help is truly warranted. Moreover, once the community-caretaking concern has
been addressed, any additional search or detention without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion is unreasonable.05
Answers to each question should be determined based on information the
searching officer knew or should have known at the time of the search,
consistent with the Supreme Court's understanding that the reasonableness
standard does not permit courts to critique police behavior with the
omniscience of hindsight.30 6 As explained more fully in Part V, police may
search "reasonably"-whether for law-enforcement purposes or otherwise-
even if their assessment of the need for action turns out to be incorrect.
304. See Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229,235-36 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that
an anonymous and uncorroborated 911 call was insufficient to justify a warrantless entry into a
private home). But see United States v. Wiggins, 192 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(upholding a search undertaken in response to a false, anonymous 911 report of a shooting, but
basing the holding on other factors in addition to the call that indicated that the apartment in
question was the site of drug trafficking).
305. See Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22 (1984) (holding that a call for medical
assistance was insufficient to justify a warrantless search of a home beyond the initial "'victim-
or-suspect"' search and any search conducted under the "plain-view doctrine"); Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,295 (1978) (establishing that awarrantless search of an apartment is not
"constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there"); State v.
Gonzales, 141 P.3d 501, 507-09 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that the officer "exceeded the
scope of the safety stop by asking investigative questions and continuing the detention to run a
background check on the vehicle's occupants").
306. Cf Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,452-53 (1990) (concluding that
the seriousness of the intrusion effected during a sobriety checkpoint was to be viewed from the
perspective of a sober driver). Thus, the anxiety caused by the potential discovery of criminal
activity would not be relevant to the calculus.
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C. First-Party Community Caretaking
In cases where the subject of the search poses a potential threat to the
community, courts should be able to balance the intrusion against the potential
danger, even though such balancing can hardly be reduced to hard-and-fast
rules.3 °7 As demonstrated above, the Court employs a similar balancing test in
special-needs cases, and in principle the calculation is simple: Compare the
privacy harm committed through community caretaking with the harm sought
to be avoided by it, discounted by the probability that the entry will not in fact
limit or eliminate the harm, with each fact evaluated as the officer knew it or
reasonably should have known it at the time the action was taken.
Where the police are acting to minimize a threat posed to (rather than by)
the subject of the search, however, the balancing test is not so easy to apply.
Judges issuing warrants in the traditional law-enforcement model are obligated
to limit the public's desire for crime prevention and detection when it interferes
too much with individual privacy concerns. 308 But in first-party community-
caretaking cases, the community as such has no interest in searching; the judge
must balance the privacy interest of the subject of the search against the interest
the subject of the search has in receiving police assistance. 309
With the same party's interests on both side of the equation, the job of the
person deciding the reasonableness of a search or seizure is not to limit one
party's desires when they impinge on another's, but to give effect to the desires
of the subject of the search or seizure. Thus, reasonableness in a case where
government is acting to help an individual by subjecting him or her to a search
or seizure should depend on whether the searching officials have appropriately
represented the interests and desires of the subject.
If, therefore, the subject of the search is able to communicate with the
police and indicates his or her desire that no entry take place, then that should
307. See, e.g., Kalmas v. Wagner, 943 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Wash. 1997) ("Whether an
encounter made for noncriminal noninvestigatory purposes is reasonable depends on a
balancing of the individual's interest in freedom from police interference against the public's
interest in having the police perform a "'community caretaking function."' (citations omitted));
cf, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that states
may require drivers involved in accidents to stop and identify themselves).
308. See United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983) ("It is the
magistrate's duty to hold the balance steady between the protection of individual privacy on the
one hand and the public need to recover evidence of wrongdoing on the other.").
309. See Byers, 402 U.S. at 427 ("Tension between the State's demand for disclosures and
the protection of the right against self-incrimination... must be resolved in terms of balancing
the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the
other ... ").
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be the end of the matter.31° On the other hand, if an individual ex ante were to
notify the police department that a particular relative is authorized to allow a
police entry into his or her home,3 n then such authorization would be valid and,
through an application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,3 12 purported
authorization by someone else would likely not be valid.
In many cases, however, the police will be unable to communicate with
the subject of the search prior to the search itself. Indeed, the presumed
incapacity of the subject may be the very reason for the entry. In those cases, a
reasonable search is one to which we would expect the subject would consent,
if he or she were able to do so. 3 13 By the same token, if a person appears
capable of asking for assistance but does not do so, then courts should presume
that the person did not desire such assistance. For example, if a police officer
approaches a legally parked car and detains its occupants because he wishes to
offer directions, such a seizure should be held invalid. If, however, the
occupants appeared to be ill, then one could infer that they wished for the
officer to help, until they indicated that they would prefer the officer to leave.
Courts sometimes ask whether the officer reasonably believed that a
person subject to a search of seizure was "in need of assistance. '" 314 That
310. See State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218,223 (Minn. 1992) (holding a warrantless entry
unconstitutional when officers were told that their help was not needed); State v. Fisher, 2004
WL 440402, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2004) (holding unconstitutional a police seizure of a
motorist who appeared to be having car trouble after the motorist indicated to the officers that
"all was okay"); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20 cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) ("There can be no claim [for restitution] for services that a
recipient of full legal capacity has attempted to refuse ....").
311. If the subject of the search him- or herself asks for the assistance of authorities, the
case is even easier. See Kalmas, 943 P.2d at 1372 ("Here, Plaintiffs themselves asked the police
to perform a caretaking function.").
312. See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBLE SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:24 (7th ed. 2008).
313. Cf. State v. Maddox, 54 P.3d 464, 468 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (holding
unconstitutional a seizure of a motorist for the motorist's own protection, when any danger
presented would have been apparent to him).
314. See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 686 P.2d 750, 760 (Ariz. 1984) ("'(1) The police must have
reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for
their assistance for the protection of life or property.'" (quoting People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d
607, 609 (N.Y. 1976))); State v. Lovegren, 51 P.3d 471, 475 (Mont. 2002) ("[1]f an officer
states that he stopped to assist a person who appeared to be in need of assistance, an objective
view of the specific and articulable facts must be examined to determine whether they support
the officer's statements."); State v. Guernsey, 84 P.3d 524, 530 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001) ("[Traffic]
stops are valid only if a person, given the totality of the circumstances, would reasonably believe
the driver was in need of assistance." (citation omitted)); Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 155
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ("[A] court should examine whether the purpose expressed by the
officer for the stop is consistent with his legitimate role as community caretaker.").
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approach improperly appears to allow police to help someone who needs, but
does not want, police assistance; prohibits police from helping people who
want, but do not need, assistance (unless valid consent is obtained); and forces
courts to determine what kinds of needs satisfy the standard. We can avoid all
those unfortunate consequences if we adopt an individualized approach to first-
party community caretaking, and focus on what the subject of the search wants.
Courts assessing a "government interest" in protecting the well being of
the person whose privacy was compromised must either operate under the
assumption that there is a government interest in individuals' well-being apart
from the interest those individuals hold in their own well-being, or that
government may act temporarily on behalf of the individual to be protected,
presuming that the individual would want to be helped until there is reason to
believe the contrary. The second approach, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment's reservation of areas of individual privacy, places sovereignty
with the individual, leaving it to each person whether to sacrifice his or her
privacy unless the state can show that maintaining privacy is likely to create
more harm to others, or unless the Fourth Amendment's requirements for law-
enforcement searches have been met.3' 5 By contrast, the first approach, in
permitting government to act when it determines that people would be better off
sacrificing some privacy, turns away from the Fourth Amendment's distrust of
316we-know-what's-good-for-you government.
Consent searches and first-party assistance searches differ from other
warrant exceptions in that the former two categories "have nothing to do with
the overriding needs of law enforcement because probable cause to search or
seize may be totally lacking. 31 7 As Professor Ronald Bacigal has argued in
criticizing some of the Supreme Court's consent-search jurisprudence, the
"right to personal autonomy" protected by the Constitution entitles the
individual "to grant or withhold cooperation at the individual's discretion-
rational or otherwise. 3 18 When the government acts only to protect the well-
being of an individual citizen, "the only relevant perspective is that of the
315. Cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973) (concluding that a
subjective standard for consent searches is appropriate for determining whether the purported
consent was voluntarily given).
316. See, e.g., State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 430 (Or. 1980) ("We conclude that the
governmental interest in the enforcement of laws for the preservation of wildlife in this state is
sufficiently substantial to justify the minimal intrusion upon the Fourth Amendment rights of
those stopped for brief questioning and a visual inspection of their vehicles.").
317. Bacigal, supra note 68, at 729.
318. Id. at 728.
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individual citizen, who must be taken as the officer finds him-subjective warts
and all."319
Considering implied consent in first-party assistance searches is also
consistent with approaches taken in other areas of law. Tort law privileges
otherwise trespassory entries where they "reasonably appear] to be necessary to
prevent serious harm to" persons or property, "unless the actor knows or has
reason to know that the one for whose benefit he enters is unwilling that he
shall take such action." 320  Similarly, presuming consent in certain
circumstances accords with established contract law, under which physicians
assisting unconscious persons will receive compensation for those efforts, even
though the patient was unable to agree in advance to pay for those services.32'
The implied-consent theory does not, however, fit well with the language
the courts have chosen to employ in Fourth Amendment cases, which refer
specifically to a "government interest" to be weighed against the interest of the
people searched. 322  Moreover, in approving some community-caretaking
searches and seizures that occurred despite the subject's apparent preference
otherwise, some courts have implicitly concluded that the government acts not
just as a stand-in for the presumed victim, but in defense of its own interests.
323
Finding a government interest in protecting people who do not want to be
protected, however, appears at odds with the Constitution's preservation of
"enclaves" immune from "government interference. 3 24  The Court has
emphatically rejected the idea that government can override individual choices
as to fundamental decisions, 325 reasoning that
319. Id. at 729.
320. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965).
321. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2002) ("A person who performs, supplies, or obtains professional services
reasonably necessary for the protection of another's life or health has a claim in restitution
against the other if the circumstances justify the claimant's decision to intervene without a prior
agreement for payment or reimbursement.").
322. See, e.g., State v. Mireles, 991 P.2d 878, 881 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (upholding a
search on the basis of the "public interest in motorist assistance" where the motorist who might
have needed assistance was the one seized).
323. See United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 680 (Mich. 1994) ("The Supreme Court
has recognized four situations satisfying the exigent circumstances exception: (1) hot pursuit of
a fleeing felon; (2) imminent destruction of evidence; (3) need to prevent a suspect's escape;
and (4) risk of danger to police or others." (citations omitted)).
324. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
325. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (rejecting the
argument offered by amici and by Justice Breyer in dissent that D.C.'s handgun ban was
justified by the government's concern with accidental shootings, and noting that "the
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table"
(citations omitted)); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,660 (2000) (holding that "greater
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[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.
326
The right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment is
unquestionably fundamental, as the Court has recognized for sixty years,327 and
therefore the government should not be able to abridge that right based solely
on the government's belief that the individual is making a mistake by refusing
assistance. Indeed, standard Fourth Amendment law permits people to retain
privacy regardless of public opinion, even where the police suspect criminal
activity, unless a warrant or the consent of the searched party is obtained.3 2 s
Under this reasoning, police should be able to act in a community-caretaking
capacity only when they take actions in furtherance of the actual or presumed
desires of the person sought to be helped. Where the person makes plain that
help is not desired, intrusions into areas of privacy are no longer warranted.
Still another difficulty is apparent with an approach to reasonableness that
simply balances the applicable interests: What law-abiding person would
object to the state's intrusion, if that intrusion were for the purpose of checking
on the person's safety? If the person is indeed safe, there is usually little
intrusion, and little harm is done.32 9 If the person is in need of assistance, the
person is likely to be extremely grateful for the officer's proactivity. This could
mean that there is little to balance-perhaps it is reasonable in the vast majority
of cases to make community-caretaking entries, simply because most people
societal acceptance" of homosexuality "is scarcely an argument for denying First Amendment
protection to those who refuse to accept these views"); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69
(2000) (holding that the state cannot constitutionally interfere with parental decisions
concerning child-rearing based simply on a disagreement concerning the child's best interests);
Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981) ("[A~s is true of all
expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the ground that they
view a particular expression as unwise or irrational.").
326. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
327. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is
basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause.").
328. See generally, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
329. See Livingston, supra note 3, at 273-74 ("[W]hen police enter the home of an elderly
woman to ensure that she is not injured within, their 'search' does not 'damage reputation or
manifest official suspicion."' (citations omitted)).
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would prefer the police to adopt a better-safe-than-sorry approach. And though
the feelings of the community do not always determine reasonableness, there is
less reason to disregard common sentiment in the community-caretaking
situation because most law-abiding people can easily imagine themselves or
their family members requiring the assistance of the police. As a result, if
public sentiment in favor of such entries exists, it likely exists despite the
public's internalization of the costs of the searches. In the law-enforcement
context, by contrast, it is easy to dismiss the public's desire for more energetic
law enforcement because the law-abiding public does not see itself as the target
of such searches.33°
An individualized approach takes account of public approval for
community caretaking to the extent that it affects the officer's assessment of the
individual's desires or affects the thoughts and behavior of a reasonable person
in the officer's position. Officers would be able to effect community-caretaking
entries to assist those persons who desire assistance, and would be able to
presume such a desire if the vast majority of citizens approves of such entries.
Others, however, who place a greater value on their privacy would be able to
have their choices respected as long as they can communicate this preference.
Situations involving the disabled present an exception to the general rule,
and permit government to act in seeming contravention of the express desires of
the individual subject to the search or seizure.331 That exception, however, is a
common one in the law, and does not call into question the principle that a fully
competent person has the right to refuse police assistance.332
If the subject of the search cannot communicate with police because the
individual is incapacitated, a court or officer applying the reasonableness test
330. Applying public-choice theory, however, it is possible that because the benefits of
law-enforcement searches are widely distributed, while the costs are concentrated on the groups
subjected to the police activity, the legislative process would tend to overvalue privacy. See
Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and
Seizures, 23 TouRo L. REv. 93, 132 (2007) ("[Tlhe benefits of [searches and seizures] redound
to the population as a whole..., while the costs are.., concentrated on medium-sized groups
that are particularly effective at achieving political gains."). Such a critique loses its force if the
disaffected groups are unable to access the political process. See id. at 152-53 ("Further,
legislative burdening of these minorities is also troubling; these groups go unrepresented, the
legislature is not bound to consider their interests or respect them as persons."). In any event,
community-caretaking searches are more likely than law-enforcement searches to reflect
society's true preferences.
331. See, e.g., Vitek v. State, 750 N.E.2d 346,349 (Ind. 2001) (finding that defendant was
in need of assistance based in part on his known physical disabilities).
332. See Moline v. City of Castle Rock, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (W.D. Wash. 2005)
("Police may respond to emergencies under the community caretaking function. A competent




suggested here will attempt to discover whether that individual would desire the
police assistance if he or she were not suffering from the disability. Similarly, a
minor 333 or a person who is suffering from a state of mind that does not permit
him or her to appreciate his or her surroundings can be presumed to desire
police assistance if most persons would desire such assistance when not in such
a condition.334 Lower courts have held that arrests can constitute reasonable
seizures of disturbed individuals under the community-caretaking doctrine,335
333. Cf Williams v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 857 So. 2d 149, 153 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)
(permitting a health-care provider to recover reasonable fees for services needed by a minor,
despite the parent's pre-announced unwillingness to pay); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
REsTrTmoN AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20, illus. 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (applying
"the doctrine of necessaries" to provide a physician with a claim to restitution for services
performed on a minor).
This analysis suggests that if police reasonably think that a minor inside a house needs
assistance, the officers may constitutionally enter the home even if an adult meets them at the
door and refuses them entry. Cf Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006) (suggesting in
dicta that an officer may enter a residence over the objection of one occupant if the officer
reasonably believes there is a victim of domestic violence inside the residence). The Court
stated:
No question.., reasonably could be [raised] about the authority of the police to
enter a dwelling to protect a resident from domestic violence; so long as they have
good reason to believe such a threat exists, it would be silly to suggest that the
police would commit a tort by entering, say, to give a complaining tenant the
opportunity to collect belongings and get out safely, or to determine whether
violence (or threat of violence) has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur,
however much a spouse or other co-tenant objected.
Id.; see id. at 138-40 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("But the officer's superior claim to enter is
obvious: ... [T]he officer's precise purpose in knocking on the door was to assist with a
dispute between the Randolphs-one in which Mrs. Randolph felt the need for the protective
presence of the police.").
Of course, a minor's youth does not eliminate his or her protection under the Fourth
Amendment; police actions to protect minors must be reasonable. See State v. Kinzy, 5 P.3d
668, 679-80 (Wash. 2000) (holding unconstitutional an officer's detention of a juvenile found
in a high-crime area at night).
334. See United States v. Borchardt, 809 F.2d 1115, 1117-18(5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
medicating a prison inmate against his wishes, even if such conduct was a "search," was
reasonable where done to avoid impending death); cf RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF REsrrrrnioN
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) ("[T]he circumstances in
which emergency medical care must be provided will sometimes justify a court in concluding
that the recipient's apparent refusal either to accept services or to pay for them is without legal
effect."); id. at illus. 9 (granting hospital a restitution claim against a psychiatric patient who
declined necessary medical treatment, based on Rockville General Hosp. v. Mercier, No. CV 90
44838 S, 1992 WL 335218, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1992)).
335. See Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2001) (authorizing the arrest of an
apparently intoxicated individual from inside a vehicle); Goldsmith v. Snohomish County, 558
F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (applying the community caretaking doctrine to
authorize the temporary arrest of"a violent, injured patient.., for the sole purpose of enabling
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336even though the arrested individuals have not committed any crime, and
obviously would prefer to go about their business.33 7 Likewise, a person
attempting suicide might reasonably be interfered with by an officer who enters
the person's dwelling to stop the suicide attempt,338 because the subject's desire
for privacy at that occasion might be due to his or her temporary mental or
emotional strain.
Criminal procedure recognizes the government's ability to override
individuals' choices in analogous circumstances, even when persons without
disabilities are accorded the right to make choices without government
interference. For example, mentally incompetent criminal defendants are
unable to waive the right to counsel,339 though defendants without such a
disability have the absolute right to proceed pro se. 34 0  And, of course,
paramedics to render necessary medical aid").
336. See United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1561-62 (10th Cir. 1993) (permitting the
seizure of a motorist when the officer observed a pistol inside the vehicle, though state law
permitted the carrying of such weapons). Arguably, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), itself
authorized such seizures for the community-caretaking purpose of ensuring the safety of the
officer and the public. Terry authorized the officer conducting a pat-down search to seize any
weapons found as a result, and did not indicate that a different result would obtain if the weapon
were possessed legally. See id. at 30-31 ("[W]here a police officer observed unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude... that criminal activity may be afoot.., he is
entitled.., to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing... to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him.").
337. The arrestee in Winters went to an extreme to manifest his desire to be left alone.
After telling the officers that he did not want to be disturbed, he had to keep locking the car
doors as the officers used a "slim jim" to unlock them. At one point, Winters spread himself
across the width of the vehicle so that he could keep both doors locked simultaneously. See
Winters, 254 F.3d at 761 (describing defendant's actions to keep police officers out of his
vehicle). The officers eventually removed Winters from the vehicle by breaking a window of
the car, whereupon Winters violently resisted the arrest. See id. at 762 ("Accordingly, [the shift
commander] decided to break the passenger window of the car with his nightstick, in order to
remove appellee from the vehicle .... [A]ppellee 'was thrashing around trying to fend us off
and fight with us."').
338. See United States v. Uscanga-Ramirez, 475 F.3d 1024, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into a home and bedroom in which an
upset Uscanga-Ramirez locked himself with a gun); Seibert v. State, 923 So. 2d 460, 470-71
(Fla. 2006) (holding that the warrantless search of an apartment in response to a suicide call was
lawful because of exigent circumstances indicating the need for help); Turner v. State, 645 So.
2d 444, 447 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that warrantless entry into a motel room was
lawful when defendant left his door ajar after voluntarily opening it when police knocked and
then proceeded back into the room and placed a gun to his head).
339. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1993) (establishing the standard for
competency sufficient to allow a defendant to waive the right to counsel).
340. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1975) (stating that a defendant has a
right to represent himself in any criminal case).
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defendants acquitted by reason of insanity may be civilly committed34' even as
the dangerous and sane may not be.342 Accordingly, it is perfectly consistent
with constitutional precedent to apply a standard that gives effect to
individuals' desires while maintaining an exception for those individuals
incapable of making thoughtful choices.
D. Mixed-Motive Community Caretaking
In the real world of policing, few actions are motivated solely by one
consideration. Accordingly, doctrine should take into account the possibility
that a given search would implicate both law enforcement and community-
caretaking goals or that a search would be undertaken for the benefit of both the
person searched and the greater public.
The public interest in assistance searches is in preventing harm from
occurring, rather than bringing to justice someone who has committed a
harmful act in the past.343 Because protecting crime victims (and potential
victims) is a community-caretaking function, however, community-caretaking
activities will overlap with law enforcement. 3"
341. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983) (approving the automatic,
involuntary civil commitment of insanity acquitees). See generally ROBiNSON, supra note 132,
at 518-19 (discussing the civil commitment of insane offenders).
342. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,85-86(1992) (holding that an insanity acquitee
may not be civilly committed, despite his continuing dangerousness, once he regains his sanity).
343. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), may provide something of an exception.
That case involved a constitutional challenge to a state law requiring drivers involved in traffic
accidents to stop and identify themselves, and therefore involved an investigation into past
conduct. Id. at 426-27. Byers challenged the law as compelling him to incriminate himself,
because it was his violation of a traffic law that caused the accident. Id. The Court rejected the
claim, and in a plurality opinion Chief Justice Burger offered as one reason that the stop-and-
identify requirement "was not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the
satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents." Id. at 430; see also id. at 431
("[T]he statutory purpose is noncriminal, and self-reporting is indispensable to its fulfillment.").
The prohibition on leaving the scene of an accident, the Court noted, applied whether or not any
violation of law occurred. Id.
While the Byers plurality did permit the state to achieve its "noncriminal" purpose by
looking backwards in time to compensate for a harm that had already occurred, the primary
means of correcting the harm was the civil, rather than the criminal, justice system. Thus, Byers
is unlike the cases discussed in the text, which feature a greater connection between criminal-
law enforcement and the "special-needs" search.
344. See, e.g., Castella v. State, 959 So. 2d 1285, 1292-93 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 2007)
(deeming constitutional the seizure of individuals involved in a boating accident because
information obtained might prove useful in assessing the location and condition of victims, as
well as potential threats to public safety still present).
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Consider the following vignette from the Hitchcock thriller Psycho:345
Marion Crane steals $40,000 and flees to California. On the way, she tires
of driving and pulls to the side of the road, intending to nap briefly before
continuing. Instead, she sleeps through the night and is awakened in the
morning by a California Highway Patrol officer who knocks on the car
window. Upon waking, Crane immediately attempts to put the car in gear,
but is stopped by the officer's command to "hold it there." Crane explains
that she had been sleeping, and asks if she has broken any laws. The officer
responds that she has not. Crane then asks if she is free to leave. Rather
than allowing Crane to proceed or even answering her question, however,
the officer asks, "Is anything wrong?" Crane responds quickly that nothing
is the matter. The officer responds that Crane is acting as if something is
wrong, but the observation provokes only Crane's renewed request to be
allowed to go. The officer ignores this request and asks again if anything is
wrong, whereupon Crane says that she is in a hurry and starts her engine.
The officer tells her to turn off the engine and asks for her driver's license.
The highway patrol officer knew that Crane's behavior was strange, but did not
know what caused it. The officer likely suspected that she had committed or
was soon to commit a crime; perhaps instead she was a crime victim fleeing an
abusive boyfriend; perhaps her sleepiness and insistence on being allowed to
drive were due to intoxication or illness; or perhaps, like Crane said, she had
simply grown sleepy and did not want to waste more time that could be spent
driving. It is likely that the officer considered several different possibilities, but
his behavior is troubling because he seemed to take advantage of the situation
to investigate crime when he lacked reasonable suspicion and thus could not
prevent Crane from leaving if the only concern at issue was crime detection.34
345. PSYCHO (Universal Studios 1960).
346. Though that particular encounter is taken from fictional cinema, life imitates art. See
Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758, 766 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that appellants did not violate the
appellee's Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him for investigatory purposes and using
force during the attempt to resist); People v. Murray, 560 N.E.2d 309, 313-14 (Ill. 1990)
(holding that evidence stemming from a police search of the vehicle of a defendant who was
sleeping in his vehicle should not be suppressed because the officers were assuming a
community-caretaking role); Young v. State, 497 So. 2d 228, 231 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)
(holding that the officer was acting as a community caretaker when he seized marijuana within
his plain view of the defendant's vehicle); Howell v. State, 115 P.3d 587, 590-91 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2005) (concluding that an officer's investigatory stop of the defendant in his car was
lawful); Blakemore v. State, 758 S.W.2d 425, 427-28 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the
actions of a police officer who knocked on a truck window to question the defendant were
reasonable while checking businesses for possible break-ins). Such encounters do not constitute
searches, of course, unless-as in the vignette-the officer restrains the subject's freedom of
movement. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968) ("Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."). If the officer merely approached an apparently
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Crane's behavior fortuitously raised a question concerning her health, and,
as a result, the constitutionality of the seizure would depend on the community-
caretaking doctrine. The government would seek to defend the seizure as
motivated by a desire to protect Crane, as well as a desire to protect other
motorists who might be put at risk if Crane was not capable of operating her car
safely. Crane herself, however, was quite clear that she wanted to terminate the
encounter, and, accordingly, once the officer determined that she was not in
need of assistance, there was no need for first-person community caretaking.
Similarly, once Crane demonstrated that she was conscious and alert, it should
have been apparent that she did not present a threat to others on the road, and
therefore the Constitution did not permit the officer to detain her any further.
Mincey v. Arizona347 and Arizona v. Hicks348 presented dramatic scenarios
implicating both law enforcement and community-caretaking concerns. In both
cases, police responded to the scene of a shooting,349 and the initial entry to
investigate and check for injured persons was therefore constitutional.35°
Similarly, in People v. Ray,351 neighbors alerted police to a house whose front
door had been open all day and which appeared to be in great disorder.352 The
police arrived, looked inside, and found drugs. 353 The police entries in all three
disabled vehicle and observed contraband through the window, no search or seizure would have
occurred, and the action would not have to comply with the reasonableness standard.
347. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,401-02 (1978) (finding that the murder-scene
exception created by the Arizona Supreme Court to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
348. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (determining that the Fourth
Amendment requires the police to have probable cause to search items in plain view).
349. Id. at 323; Mincey, 437 U.S. at 387.
350. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 392-93 (discussing the constitutionality of entries involving
the checking for injured persons); Mincey, 437 U.S. at 324. (noting that the legality of the initial
entry was conceded); see also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1984) (per curiam)
(stating in dicta that an entry to offer assistance to a person who had attempted suicide would be
constitutional). Not even a report of a shooting, however, will authorize warrantless entries in
all instances. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the "emergency-aid" exception could not
authorize an entry into a motel room when officers were told of a shots-fired report at that room
or one other, and where the officers encountered a person at the room who refused them entry.
See People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 922 (Mich. 1993) (concluding that the entry into the
defendant's room violated the Fourth Amendment, and the evidence obtained pursuant to that
entry must be suppressed).
351. See People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 944 (Cal. 1999) (holding that officers' warrantless
entry through an open door, after receiving a report from neighbors that the door had been open
all day, did not violate the Fourth Amendment); see also Love v. State, 659 S.E.2d 835, 838
(Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (determining that warrantless entry may be justified by exigent
circumstances).
352. See Ray, 981 P.2d at 932 (discussing the factual background of the case).
353. Id.
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cases certainly involved criminal investigation, but were also reasonable means
of protecting the health and property interests put at risk by the suspected
criminal conduct.354 Thus, the community-caretaking doctrine can authorize
such entries by relying on the public interest implicated other than in law
enforcement, even as law-enforcement interests are implicated as well.
Applying that lesson to mixed-motive community-caretaking cases where
the officers are in part motivated by a desire to enforce the law, we should
require both that there be an objective basis justifying the officer's behavior
and also that the officers be sufficiently motivated by the community-caretaking
concern that they would have taken the actions in question had there been no
additional law-enforcement motivation.355  And, indeed, lower courts
adjudicating community-caretaking cases overwhelmingly require not only that
a reasonable officer be able to conclude that community caretaking was called
for, but that the entering officer was subjectively motivated by a community-
caretaking concern.
356
Some cases require that the community-caretaking purpose predominate in
the officer's mind,357 but such an inquiry, even if the relative predominance of
an officer's different purposes could be determined, would make little sense.358
If an officer was genuinely motivated by a community-caretaking concern, and
if that concern would have been sufficient to cause the officer to undertake the
search, it should not matter that an additional purpose also motivated the officer
even if the crime-control purpose was foremost in the officer's mind.
The inevitable-discovery doctrine again is analogous. Under that doctrine,
a court will admit illegally obtained evidence if the evidence would have been
354. See Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 740 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987)
(upholding an entry into a vehicle to learn the identity of a gunshot victim).
355. Cf State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Minn. 2007) ("[A]n objective standard
should be applied to determine the reasonableness of the officer's belief that there was an
emergency." (emphasis added)).
356. See, e.g., United States v. Borchardt, 809 F.2d 1115, 1117 (5th Cir. 1987) (requiring
that such a search be "reasonable and [in] good faith").
357. See Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 276-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ("[A] police
officer may not properly invoke his community caretaking function if he is primarily motivated
by a non-community caretaking purpose."); see also Decker, supra note 93, at 511 ("While it is
unnecessary that this community-caretaking motive be the only motive in an officer's mind at
the time of the warrantless entry, it is essential that the desire to aid.., be a primary, or at least
a substantial, part of the officer's good faith subjective motivation."). As applied to emergency
situations, Professor Decker's proposed requirement of good faith has been rejected by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006) (rejecting a good-
faith requirement in determining the constitutionality of a particular seizure).
358. Cf Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment as a "Big Time" TVFad, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 265,274 (2001) (analyzing the Court's cases concerning drug checkpoints and noting that
"it shouldn't make any difference what purpose is listed first and what is listed second").
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obtained notwithstanding the illegality.35 9 Thus, a court applying the
inevitable-discovery doctrine reconstructs the citizen-police encounter
without the illegal conduct.360 Similarly, a court applying the community-
caretaking doctrine should reconstruct the citizen-police encounter without
the law-enforcement motive and ask whether the police officer would have
searched if he or she had no law-enforcement objective.
V. Prophylactic Exclusionary Remedies
Some commentators, including Professor Wayne LaFave in his treatise
on search-and-seizure law, have argued for the application of a prophylactic
exclusionary rule for evidence found during community-caretaking searches,
but have balked at discouraging the searches themselves. 36' Accordingly,
they have suggested that though community-caretaking searches should not
require a warrant to be reasonable, evidence found during such a search
unrelated to the reason for the entry should be inadmissible. I refer to the
proposed rule as a "targeted" exclusionary rule, as it is targeted to apply only
in community-caretaking cases.
Others, including courts in Utah, have adopted an alternative
formulation. Under this second approach, nonemergency community-
caretaking searches would be unreasonable, but "legitimate" nonetheless.362
For those "legitimate" (but unconstitutional) searches, 363 an exclusionary rule
359. See Nix v. Williams, 647 U.S. 431, 437 (1984) (discussing the specifics of the
inevitable-discovery doctrine).
360. See id. ("Fairness can be assured by placing the State and the accused in the same
positions they would have been in had the impermissible conduct not taken place.").
361. See 5 LAFAVE, supra note 76, § 10. 1(c) ("[S]uch a 'special' exclusionary rule of this
type would be justified under the Fourth Amendment if the risk of undetectable subterfuge were
substantial." (citing Russell E. Lovell II, Comment, Camara and See: Accommodation Between
the Right of Privacy and the Public Need, 47 NEB. L. REV. 613, 636 (1968); Note, The Fourth
Amendment andHousing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521,537 (1968))); cf New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 664 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) ("Miranda has never been read to prohibit the police from asking questions to secure the
public safety. Rather, the critical question Miranda addresses is who shall bear the cost of
securing the public safety when such questions are asked and answered: the defendant or the
State."); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police
Discretion, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1271, 1287 (1998) ("No matter how the Court ruled in Terry,
police officers would continue frisking people they viewed as a threat to their safety. Once this
pragmatic fact was conceded, the crucial question in Terry was [whether suppression would
follow].").
362. Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), affd, 875 P.2d 557, 558
(Utah 1994).
363. See id. at 365 ("[S]tops which are legitimate exercises of police community caretaker
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would be applied. 64 Both forms of the targeted exclusionary rule have the
goal of deterring police from claiming a community-caretaking justification
when actually motivated by law-enforcement concerns,365 and thereby seek to
achieve a practical solution to the problem of pretextual community-caretaking
searches while permitting searches genuinely intended to assist the public to go
forward.
366
From a theoretical perspective as well as a doctrinal one, however, the
targeted exclusionary rule is far from satisfying. Searches are either reasonable
or unreasonable. Generally speaking,367 reasonable searches are constitutional
and give rise to no issue of remedy. Unreasonable searches are unconstitutional
and usually result in exclusion of evidence found during the unreasonable
search. The targeted exclusionary rule, however, either requires exclusion
when the police were acting reasonably in fulfilling community-caretaking
function, or calls the community-caretaking search unreasonable and excludes
evidence-all the while winking and nodding to police departments to
encourage them to act in the very manner the court holds to be
unconstitutional.368
responsibilities, but which are not 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, may result in
application of the exclusionary rule, while still achieving the objectives of community
caretaking.").
364. See id. (discussing the circumstances where the application of the exclusionary rule is
appropriate); Call, supra note 252, at 276, 278 (discussing the manner in which courts have
attempted to constrain police officers in situations where they want to help but are not enforcing
the law).
365. See 5 LAFAVE, supra note 76, § 10.1(c) (noting the problem of "undetectable
subterfuge").
366. See Warden, 844 P.2d at 365 ("This [targeted exclusionary rule] appears to be a
legitimate means of encouraging genuine police caretaking functions while deterring bogus or
pretextual police activities.").
367. Though the Court has relied on the Reasonableness Clause and has repeatedly stated
that reasonableness is the "touchstone" of the Fourth Amendment-for example, Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006);
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2002); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
108-09 (1977) (per curiam)--it remains the case that some otherwise reasonable searches are
unconstitutional in the absence of a warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590
(1980) ("Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold [the entrance to a house] may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant."); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment... subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.").
368. One can characterize a targeted exclusionary rule as equivalent to a holding that the
police behavior is unconstitutional but that the only available remedy is exclusion. Thus, the
police are-one hopes--not over-deterred from engaging in community-caretaking entries but
are also not encouraged to interfere with people's rights by the prospect of gathering evidence.
If community-caretaking entries are unconstitutional, however, it seems wrong to prevent the
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The Supreme Court has never required exclusion where the police action
has been reasonable; the exclusionary rule is a remedy for a constitutional
violation.369 Its purposes are both compensatory and deterrent, but the Court
has consistently required that the police be blameworthy before remedial action
is appropriate.370 If the police have acted reasonably, and thereby have
committed no constitutional violation, the Supreme Court has held that nothing
innocent person from receiving any remedy for the unconstitutional conduct. Limiting the
remedies to exclusion is especially troubling from a historical perspective, as tort suits had been
the principal means under the Common Law of punishing officers who had unreasonably
searched or seized. See WILSON, supra note 273, at 15-19, 45-48 (discussing tort suits as the
means of punishment for police officers that had conducted unreasonable searches and seizures).
Victims of unreasonable searches or seizures would sue the officer, and the officer would have
to claim that his conduct was privileged-a claim that would fail if the conduct was indeed
unreasonable. Indeed, if a state were to privilege unconstitutional behavior, immunizing from
all consequences those who committed it, the government would be in violation of the
Amendment. See id. at 16-17 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment must be understood as guaranteeing
the availability of a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment right."); Thomas E.
Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,
25 COLuM. L. REv. 11, 21 (1925) (arguing that one of the purposes of the Fourth Amendment
was to prevent Congress from mandating certain unreasonable searches through statute); Albert
J. Hamo, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 19 ILL. L. REv. 303, 307 (1925)
("[T]he purpose of the search and seizure clause was to restrain the legalization of unreasonable
searches and seizures.").
369. Accordingly, even where evidence was found or seized unconstitutionally, the
exclusionary rule applies only when the defendant's rights have been violated. See, e.g., United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) (holding that a defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)
("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may
not be vicariously asserted."); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969) ("The
established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be
successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those
who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence."); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1963) (stating that inadmissible evidence against one
codefendant does not compel a like result with respect to another).
370. The state-action doctrine underscores this lesson, in that "evidence secured by a
private individual-no matter how unreasonable or illegal the methods used to obtain it-is
constitutionally admissible in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the improper conduct."
1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 115, at 59-60 (citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465
(1921)). Evidence illegally obtained by a private individual is admissible, in other words,
because remedies are appropriate under the Fourth Amendment only when there has been a
violation, and private parties cannot violate the Amendment. Under similar reasoning, the
exclusionary rule should not apply when government conduct is at issue, but where that conduct
does not violate the Constitution. Cf Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)
(refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence seized by state police after an unreasonable
search because, prior to the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from such
searches, the police action did not violate the Federal Constitution), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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in the Fourth Amendment requires courts to ignore evidence that has been
discovered in such a search, even where doing so would produce beneficial
deterrent results.37'
Terry v. Ohio372 flatly rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment
requires states to impose the exclusionary rule in the absence of a constitutional
violation: "The exclusionary rule... cannot properly be invoked to exclude
the products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that
much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon
constitutional protections."
3 73
Other cases have also refused to invoke the exclusionary remedy where the
police have acted blamelessly. Most notably, the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule holds that violations of the Fourth Amendment will not result
in the exclusion of evidence obtained thereby if the officers were acting with an
"objectively reasonable belief' that their actions were constitutional.374
371. See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174 ("[No cases] hold that anything which deters illegal
searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment."). But cf Minnesota v. Dickerson,
508 U.S. 366, 382 (Scalia, J., concurring) (offering a different approach). Justice Scalia in his
concurring opinion specifically stated:
If I were of the view that Terry was (insofar as the power to 'frisk' is concerned)
incorrectly decided, I might-even if I felt bound to adhere to that case-vote to
exclude the evidence incidentally discovered, on the theory that half a
constitutional guarantee is better than none.
Id.; Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (requiring the exclusion of evidence
concerning a charge for which the defendant invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel if
the police "knowingly circumvent[ed]" the right by asking about a different crime). Jones, of
course, preceded Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which required the states to exclude
illegally seized evidence, largely because of the exclusionary rule's deterrence benefits. See id.
at 655-57 ("[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guarantee in the only effective available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it."' (citations omitted)). Mapp, however, excluded illegally seized evidence for
reasons of deterrence. It did not require legally obtained evidence to be excluded regardless of
the deterrence benefits that might be obtained thereby. Moulton, by appearing to limit its
remedy to situations where the police are "knowingly circumventing" the Sixth Amendment
right, may be incorporating a pretext analysis. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 115, at
552-53 (stating that the state may violate the Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the
accused's right to the assistance of counsel). In any event, Moulton's rule for the Sixth
Amendment is inconsistent with the Court's Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990) (holding that the plain-view doctrine authorized a seizure
of evidence found during the execution of a warrant for other items, even if the evidence was not
found inadvertently).
372. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
373. Id. at 13.
374. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained
by the police acting in good faith pursuant to a search warrant subsequently found to be
deficient may still be used in a criminal trial).
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Similarly, the Court has permitted police to ask questions in violation of
Miranda v. Arizona375 where the questions were "reasonably prompted by a
concern for the public safety."
376
In those two situations, violations of the Constitution and the Miranda rule
were held insufficient to trigger the exclusionary rule.377 A fortiori, police
action that is constitutional because it is "reasonable" should not cause the
exclusion of evidence.378 In Maryland v. Garrison,3 79 for example, police
erroneously, but reasonably,- entered Garrison's apartment in an attempt to
execute a warrant for the search of a different apartment. 380 The Supreme
Court held that because the action was reasonable, it was constitutional, and as
a result declined to order the exclusion of the evidence found in Garrison's
apartment.
38'
Most pertinent to the community-caretaking cases, the Supreme Court has
stated in dictum that police may enter a home without a warrant to ensure the
safety of an abuse victim, "[a]nd since the police would then be lawfully in the
premises, there is no question that they could seize any evidence in plain view
or take further action supported by any consequent probable cause. ' 382 Even
more directly, the Court has stated that "the police may seize any evidence that
is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.0
83
375. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,498-99 (1966) (holding that a police officer
must advise a suspect interrogated in custody of the right to remain silent and obtain an attorney
in order to satisfy one's Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination).
376. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,656 (1984) (discussing how Miranda should
be applied in situations where public safety is a concern).
377. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 (stating that a constitutional violation will not necessarily
trigger the exclusionary rule); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 (concluding that respondent's
incriminating statements need not be suppressed despite the officer's failure to read the
respondent his Miranda rights).
378. But cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (requiring states to
comply with the requirements of Miranda, while seemingly adhering to prior holdings that the
Miranda warnings are prophylactic measures to guard against Fifth Amendment violations).
379. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79,85, 88-89 (1987) (determining that a warrant
and its execution were valid despite the warrant being broader than appropriate due to a
mistaken belief about the place to be searched and despite the officers' search of the incorrect
apartment).
380. Id. at 80.
381. See id. at 88-89 ("[T]he officers' conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to
ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.").
382. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006).
383. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,393 (1978); see also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469
U.S. 17, 22 (1984) (per curiam) (stating in dictum that police could have "seiz[ed] evidence
under the plain-view doctrine while they were in petitioner's house to offer her assistance" that
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Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence
if police have acted reasonably, even if doing so would provide a powerful
prophylactic deterrent for Fourth Amendment violations.
384
If, on the other hand, a community-caretaking search is unreasonable and
triggers the exclusionary remedy for that reason, courts have no business
announcing, as Utah's courts did,385 that such unconstitutional entries are
"legitimate." Police departments should obey the strictures of the Constitution
not because of the consequences of violating those limitations, but because they
are the law, and courts above all should not encourage unconstitutional
behavior.386 An unreasonable community-caretaking search should trigger all
the remedies applicable to any other Fourth Amendment violation, but such a
search is not unreasonable solely because it lacks probable cause.
States wishing to take advantage of the targeted exclusionary rule's
pragmatic benefits may, however, wish to adopt such a rule by statute. In
particular, states skeptical of courts' ability to determine when an officer's
claim of a community-caretaking motivation is pretextual may find the targeted
exclusionary rule attractive. Such a rule would presumably require the
exclusion of probative evidence even where the officer's motive was not in
question, as where the officer's behavior was in response to a life-threatening
emergency. Exclusion in such a case would appear to be bad policy, but a state
could reasonably conclude that the disadvantage of such exclusion would be
outweighed by the rule's discouraging of unconstitutional law-enforcement-
motivated searches.
V. Conclusion
Most people who appear to be in distress would welcome a genuine offer
of police assistance. But permitting police to search or seize whenever they
might be pursuing community-caretaking goals risks undermining
she had requested).
384. On the Supreme Court's prophylactic rules of criminal procedure, see generally Susan
R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental
Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1030 (2001) (discussing the
Supreme Court's prophylactic rules of criminal procedure).
385. See generally Provo City v. Warden, 833 P.3d 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), aft'd, 875
P.2d 557, 558 (Utah 1994).
386. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example.... If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.").
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constitutional protections. The challenge of community-caretaking doctrine is
to permit helpful police to fulfill their function of assisting the public, while
ensuring that searches for law-enforcement purposes satisfy the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment.
Requiring government to demonstrate that officers conducting any
assistance search actually attempt to aid the public advances both these goals.
An official genuinely trying to help others will not be affected by such a
requirement, and applying the exclusionary rule to searches motivated by law-
enforcement interests will deter police from violating the Amendment.
When balancing the interests involved in a community-caretaking search,
courts should bear in mind that police are acting on behalf of the party that
needs help. When police seek to help someone other than the person searched,
courts must determine which interest is weightier: the interest in providing
help, or the interest in being free of the search. When the person being helped
and the person being searched are the one and the same, there is nothing to
balance-the government should provide assistance only when officials
reasonably believe that person would want help.
The government's power to help the public is often beneficial, but can also
be dangerous if misused. The framework offered here permits courts to
distinguish between proper and improper uses of the community-caretaking
authority, and gives content to the Fourth Amendment's command that such
actions be reasonable.
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